XXI.
Sed primus dies impetu magis quam veterani exercitus artibus transactus: aperti incautique muros subiere, cibo vinoque praegraves. in eo certamine pulcherrimum amphitheatri opus, situm extra muros, conflagravit, sive ab obpugnatoribus incensum, dum faces et glandis et missilem ignem in obsessos iaculantur, sive ab obsessis, dum regerunt. municipale vulgus, pronum ad suspiciones, fraude inlata ignis alimenta credidit a quibusdam ex vicinis coloniis invidia et aemulatione, quod nulla in Italia moles tam capax foret. quocumque casu accidit, dum atrociora metuebantur, in levi habitum, reddita securitate, tamquam nihil gravius pati potuissent, maerebant. ceterum multo suorum cruore pulsus Caecina, et nox parandis operibus absumpta. Vitelliani pluteos cratisque et vineas subfodiendis muris protegendisque obpugnatoribus, Othoniani sudis et immensas lapidum ac plumbi aerisque molis perfringendis obruendisque hostibus expediunt. utrimque pudor, utrimque gloria et diversae exhortationes hinc legionum et Germanici exercitus robur, inde urbanae militiae et praetoriarum cohortium decus attollentium; illi ut segnem et desidem et circo ac theatris corruptum militem, hi peregrinum et externum increpabant. simul Othonem ac Vitellium celebrantes culpantesve uberioribus inter se probris quam laudibus stimulabantur.
21.
But the first day saw only violent attacks rather than any tactical move worthy of a veteran army: they advanced to the walls without cover or caution, heavy with food and wine. During that clash the beautiful structure of an amphitheater, located outside the walls, burned down, either set on fire by the besiegers while they hurled firebrands, leaden balls, and incendiary javelins at the besieged or by the besieged throwing the fire back at the assailants. The townsfolk, always inclined to suspect the worst, were convinced that someone from the neighboring colonies, driven by rivalry or envy — since no other edifice so vast existed in Italy– had brought combustible matter into the amphitheater with criminal intent. Whatever the cause of the disaster, little was made of it as long as more terrible things were feared. When security returned, the loss was deplored as if nothing worse could have befallen the colony. In any case, Caecina was repulsed with heavy losses and both sides spent the night preparing fresh means of attack and defense. The Vitellians brought up movable screens, protective hurdles, and sheds on rollers to protect the besiegers while trying to sap the walls of the town. The Othonians made ready wooden beams pointed at one end, huge mounds of stones, and heavy lumps of lead and brass to maul and crush the enemy with. On either side the same concern for honor, the same desire for glory, but each army encouraged its men in opposite ways: here the might of the legions and the army of Germany were exalted, there the renown of the urban militia and of the praetorian cohorts; these accused their adversaries of cowardice, of being spoiled by the circus and the theater, those called the other side foreigners and barbarians. Otho’s and Vitellius’ names were heard celebrated and vilified at the same time, yet the exchange of insults stimulated the combatants’ courage more than the praise.
XXII.
Vixdum orto die plena propugnatoribus moenia, fulgentes armis virisque campi: densum legionum agmen, sparsa auxiliorum manus altiora murorum sagittis aut saxis incessere, neglecta aut aevo fluxa comminus adgredi. ingerunt desuper Othoniani pila librato magis et certo ictu adversus temere subeuntis cohortis Germanorum, cantu truci et more patrio nudis corporibus super umeros scuta quatientium. legionarius pluteis et cratibus tectus subruit muros, instruit aggerem, molitur portas: contra praetoriani dispositos ad id ipsum molaris ingenti pondere ac fragore provolvunt. pars subeuntium obruti, pars confixi et exangues aut laceri: cum augeret stragem trepidatio eoque acrius e moenibus vulnerarentur, rediere infracta partium fama. et Caecina pudore coeptae temere obpugnationis, ne inrisus ac vanus isdem castris adsideret, traiecto rursus Pado Cremonam petere intendit. tradidere sese abeunti Turullius Cerialis cum compluribus classicis et Iulius Briganticus cum paucis equitum, hic praefectus alae in Batavis genitus, ille primipilaris et Caecinae haud alienus, quod ordines in Germania duxerat.
22.
The new day had hardly dawned and already the town’s walls were crowded with defenders and the fields around glittered with men in arms. The legions in tight formations and the auxiliaries in dispersed order aimed arrows and stones at the upper levels of the walls and where the walls appeared less defended or weakened by age an attack was made at close quarters. The Othonians from above rained down javelins with well-balanced and accurate aim on the Germans coming up to the wall in reckless disorder, singing their uncouth songs, half-naked as is their custom and brandishing the shields above their shoulders. The legionaries, sheltered by screens and hurdles, labored at weakening the wall, began to build a ramp, and strove to force the gates. On their side, the praetorians rolled down on them boulders –positioned in advance for this purpose—the size and weight of millstones which hit the ground with a thunderous crash. Part of the assailants under the wall were crushed, others were pinned or mangled by the weight and drained of their strength and blood. As panic was adding to their casualties, at the same time encouraging the defenders to double their efforts, they withdrew, with crippling loss of prestige to their party. Caecina, ashamed of his foolhardy assault on Placentia, to avoid being laughed at and to appear ineffectual if he remained in the same camp, decided to recross the Po and march on Cremona. Turullius Cerialis with a large contingent of navy troops and Julius Briganticus with a few horsemen surrendered to him. The latter, a Batavian by birth, was a cavalry prefect and the former a senior centurion well-known to Caecina, having served in Germany at the head of a century.
XXIII.
Spurinna comperto itinere hostium defensam Placentiam, quaeque acta et quid Caecina pararet, Annium Gallum per litteras docet. Gallus legionem primam in auxilium Placentiae ducebat, diffisus paucitati cohortium, ne longius obsidium et vim Germanici exercitus parum tolerarent. ubi pulsum Caecinam pergere Cremonam accepit, aegre coercitam legionem et pugnandi ardore usque ad seditionem progressam Bedriaci sistit. inter Veronam Cremonamque situs est vicus, duabus iam Romanis cladibus notus infaustusque. Isdem diebus a Martio Macro haud procul Cremona prospere pugnatum; namque promptus animi Martius transvectos navibus gladiatores in adversam Padi ripam repente effudit. turbata ibi Vitellianorum auxilia, et ceteris Cremonam fugientibus caesi qui restiterant: sed repressus vincentium impetus ne novis subsidiis firmati hostes fortunam proelii mutarent. suspectum id Othonianis fuit, omnia ducum facta prave aestimantibus. certatim, ut quisque animo ignavus, procax ore, Annium Gallum et Suetonium Paulinum et Marium Celsum–nam eos quoque Otho praefecerat–variis criminibus incessebant. acerrima seditionum ac discordiae incitamenta, interfectores Galbae scelere et metu vaecordes miscere cuncta, modo palam turbidis vocibus, modo occultis ad Othonem litteris; qui humillimo cuique credulus, bonos metuens trepidabat, rebus prosperis incertus et inter adversa melior. igitur Titianum fratrem accitum bello praeposuit.
23.
Spurinna, being well informed of the enemy’s movements, wrote to Annius Gallus all that had occurred, the defense of Placentia and what Caecina’s plans were. Gallus was at the time bringing the First legion to the rescue of Placentia, little trusting that a few cohorts could alone sustain a long siege and the might of the German army. When he heard of Caecina’s setback and of his marching on Cremona, he halted the legion’s march at Bedriacum — a village between Verona and Cremona inauspiciously famous in years to come for two Romans debacles –, though Gallus had a hard time restraining his men, who came to the very brink of sedition in their eagerness to fight. At about the same time, Martius Macer fought a successful engagement near Cremona. A resolute man, Martius took his gladiators across the Po in ships and launched a surprise attack on the other side, routing Vitellius’ auxiliaries. All those who resisted were killed, the rest fled to Cremona, but Martius reined in the impetus of his victorious troops, in case the enemy, reinforced by fresh troops, should change the fortunes of war. His decision raised suspicion in the minds of Otho’s troops who found fault with everything the generals did. Emulating one another, all the craven big-mouths in the ranks levelled all sorts of accusations at Annius Gallus and also at Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, for they too had been assigned command by Otho. None were more ardent in fomenting sedition and discontent than Galba’s murderers: hounded by their own guilt and by fear [of retribution], they sowed disorder everywhere, now openly voicing their seditious sentiments, now by secret messages to Otho, who, always willing to believe the lowest of men and to distrust the best, was in constant state of alarm, hesitant in prosperity, more resolute in adversity. So he had his brother Titianus come to him and gave him command of the war.
XXIV.
Interea Paulini et Celsi ductu res egregie gestae. angebant Caecinam nequiquam omnia coepta et senescens exercitus sui fama. pulsus Placentia, caesis nuper auxiliis, etiam per concursum exploratorum, crebra magis quam digna memoratu proelia, inferior, propinquante Fabio Valente, ne omne belli decus illuc concederet, reciperare gloriam avidius quam consultius properabat. ad duodecimum a Cremona (locus Castorum vocatur) ferocissimos auxiliarium imminentibus viae lucis occultos componit: equites procedere longius iussi et inritato proelio sponte refugi festinationem sequentium elicere, donec insidiae coorerentur. proditum id Othonianis ducibus, et curam peditum Paulinus, equitum Celsus sumpsere. tertiae decimae legionis vexillum, quattuor auxiliorum cohortes et quingenti equites in sinistro locantur; aggerem viae tres praetoriae cohortes altis ordinibus obtinuere; dextra fronte prima legio incessit cum duabus auxiliaribus cohortibus et quingentis equitibus: super hos ex praetorio auxiliisque mille equites, cumulus prosperis aut subsidium laborantibus, ducebantur.
24.
Meanwhile things had gone well for Otho under the leadership of Paulinus and Celsus. Caecina was greatly disturbed by the failure of all his undertakings and by the dwindling fame of his army. Repulsed at Placentia, deprived of his auxiliaries recently cut to pieces, bested even in the encounters of scouts (mere skirmishes more frequent than memorable) he hurried with more eagerness than prudence to recover his good name, especially since Fabius Valens was now approaching and he feared that all the honor of the war would go to him. At a place called “The Castors’’, twelve miles from Cremona, he placed in ambush the most aggressive of his auxiliaries in the woods dominating the road. He told the cavalry to ride farther on and to provoke battle then pretend to flee so as to lure the enemy into pursuing them until the men in ambuscade should spring into action. The plan was reported to Otho’s generals and Paulinus assumed command of the infantry, Celsus of the cavalry. A detachment of the Third legion, four auxiliary cohorts, and five hundred cavalry were placed on the left flank. The causeway of the road was held by three praetorian cohorts arranged in deep formation. On the right front the First legion took position with two auxiliary cohorts and five hundred cavalry. In addition a thousand cavalry of the Praetorian Guard and of the auxiliaries were brought up either to crown a successful outcome or to provide support in case of difficulties.
XXV.
Antequam miscerentur acies, terga vertentibus Vitellianis, Celsus doli prudens repressit suos: Vitelliani temere exurgentes cedente sensim Celso longius secuti ultro in insidias praecipitantur; nam a lateribus cohortes, legionum adversa frons, et subito discursu terga cinxerant equites. signum pugnae non statim a Suetonio Paulino pediti datum: cunctator natura et cui cauta potius consilia cum ratione quam prospera ex casu placerent, compleri fossas, aperiri campum, pandi aciem iubebat, satis cito incipi victoriam ratus ubi provisum foret ne vincerentur. ea cunctatione spatium Vitellianis datum in vineas nexu traducum impeditas refugiendi; et modica silva adhaerebat, unde rursus ausi promptissimos praetorianorum equitum interfecere. vulneratur rex Epiphanes, impigre pro Othone pugnam ciens.
25.
Before clashing with the enemy, the Vitellian cavalry turned and fled, but Celsus, being aware of the ploy, kept his men back. Then the Vitellian infantry rashly surged from their ambush and, when Celsus gradually retreated, they followed too far, ultimately placing their own heads in a trap, for they had the Othonian auxiliaries on their flanks, they faced Roman infantry in front, and their rear was enveloped by a sudden movement of the cavalry. Suetonius Paulinus did not immediately give his infantry the signal to attack. He was a temporizer by nature who much preferred prudent and thought-out plans to accidental success. [Thus], he kept giving orders to fill ditches, to clear the fields of obstacles, to extend the line, persuaded that victory would come soon enough, when precautions had been taken to avoid defeat. The delay gave the Vitellians time to find refuge in some vineyards, where movement was hampered by the rows and tangles of the vines. A stand of trees was also nearby from which they ventured to counterattack, killing the boldest of the praetorian troopers. King Epiphanes was wounded while vigorously cheering the men on to fight for Otho.
XXVI.
Tum Othonianus pedes erupit; protrita hostium acie versi in fugam etiam qui subveniebant; nam Caecina non simul cohortis sed singulas acciverat, quae res in proelio trepidationem auxit, cum dispersos nec usquam validos pavor fugientium abriperet. orta et in castris seditio quod non universi ducerentur: vinctus praefectus castrorum Iulius Gratus, tamquam fratri apud Othonem militanti proditionem ageret, cum fratrem eius, Iulium Frontonem tribunum, Othoniani sub eodem crimine vinxissent. ceterum ea ubique formido fuit apud fugientis occursantis, in acie pro vallo, ut deleri cum universo exercitu Caecinam potuisse, ni Suetonius Paulinus receptui cecinisset, utrisque in partibus percrebruerit. timuisse se Paulinus ferebat tantum insuper laboris atque itineris, ne Vitellianus miles recens e castris fessos adgrederetur et perculsis nullum retro subsidium foret. apud paucos ea ducis ratio probata, in vulgus adverso rumore fuit.
26.
Then the Othonian infantry charged, crushing the enemy lines and putting to flight even the troops rushing in to support them, for Caecina had not engaged the cohorts together, but one at a time, a decision which only added to the confusion of the fight, since in arriving separately and nowhere in sufficient force, they were dragged along by the mass of terrified fugitives. In the camp also there was mutiny, because they were not being led out all at the same time. The prefect of the camp, Julius Gratus, was put in chains accused of treacherous activities on behalf of his brother, the tribune Julius Fronto, who was serving under Otho and had been similarly accused and treated by the other side. In any case, such was the general panic among the men fleeing or rushing both into the battle line and before the trenches that Caecina and his entire army could have been destroyed had not Suetonius Paulinus sounded the retreat; at least this is what was widely believed on both sides. Paulinus’ defense was that he had spared his men much additional effort and the long march [required to reach and attack the Vitellian camp] for fear that the enemy, fresh from camp, might counterattack his worn-out forces: furthermore, he had no reserves at his back to rely on in case of defeat. His reasons were approved by a small minority, but the comments circulating among the rank and file were anything but favorable.
XXVII.
Haud proinde id damnum Vitellianos in metum compulit quam ad modestiam composuit: nec solum apud Caecinam, qui culpam in militem conferebat seditioni magis quam proelio paratum: Fabii quoque Valentis copiae (iam enim Ticinum venerat) posito hostium contemptu et reciperandi decoris cupidine reverentius et aequalius duci parebant. gravis alioquin seditio exarserat, quam altiore initio (neque enim rerum a Caecina gestarum ordinem interrumpi oportuerat) repetam. cohortes Batavorum, quas bello Neronis a quarta decima legione digressas, cum Britanniam peterent, audito Vitellii motu in civitate Lingonum Fabio Valenti adiunctas rettulimus, superbe agebant, ut cuiusque legionis tentoria accessissent, coercitos a se quartadecimanos, ablatam Neroni Italiam atque omnem belli fortunam in ipsorum manu sitam iactantes. contumeliosum id militibus, acerbum duci; corrupta iurgiis aut rixis disciplina; ad postremum Valens e petulantia etiam perfidiam suspectabat.
27.
The reversal did not so much intimidate the Vitellians as make them more responsive to discipline, not only in Caecina’s army, who blamed the soldiers [for the setback] accusing them of being more inclined to rebel than to fight, but also among Fabius Valens’ troops, who had by this time arrived at Ticinum. They now ceased to regard their adversaries as inferior and, moved by strong desire to recover their former reputation, obeyed their general with more deference and regularity. A serious revolt had broken out on a previous occasion, which I will now recount in detail from its start further back in time, as I did not think it proper to interrupt the sequence of Caecina’s operations [just to keep events in chronological order]. I have already mentioned how the Batavian cohorts had been detached from the Fourteenth legion in [Vindex’] war against Nero and how, on being sent [by Galba] to Britain and hearing of Vitellius’ revolt in the country of the Lingones, they had joined the forces of Fabius Valens. These troops were now behaving in an insolent manner, boasting, as they passed the tents of the legions, of having kept the Fourteenth legion under their thumb, of wresting Italy from Nero, and of being the deciding factor in the current war. Such language was offensive to the soldiers and galling to Valens. Discipline in the ranks was upset by quarrels and brawls and in the end Valens began to suspect that their turbulence might be a prelude to perfidy.
XXVIII.
Igitur nuntio adlato pulsam Trevirorum alam Tungrosque a classe Othonis et Narbonensem Galliam circumiri, simul cura socios tuendi et militari astu cohortis turbidas ac, si una forent, praevalidas dispergendi, partem Batavorum ire in subsidium iubet. quod ubi auditum vulgatumque, maerere socii, fremere legiones. orbari se fortissimorum virorum auxilio; veteres illos et tot bellorum victores, postquam in conspectu sit hostis, velut ex acie abduci. si provincia urbe et salute imperii potior sit, omnes illuc sequerentur; sin victoriae [sanitas sustentaculum] columen in Italia verteretur, non abrumpendos ut corpori validissimos artus.
28.
Therefore, when news arrived that the Treviran cavalry regiment and the Tungrian infantry had been beaten off by the Othonian navy and that Gallia Narbonensis was being blockaded, Valens ordered a number of the Batavian cohorts to go to the rescue, in part out of concern for the safety of allies, in part as a good opportunity to disperse fractious and, if united, formidable troops. When the decision became known in the army, the auxiliaries were demoralized and the legionaries furious. They were deprived, they protested, of the support of the bravest soldiers. Those veterans, victorious in so many wars, were being removed from the battlefield, one might say, just when the enemy was facing them. If a province was preferable to Rome and to the security of the empire, why did they not all follow the Batavi there? If, [on the contrary], Italy was the cornerstone of victory, the strongest limbs must not be torn, as it were, from the body of the army.
XXIX.
Haec ferociter iactando, postquam immissis lictoribus Valens coercere seditionem coeptabat, ipsum invadunt, saxa iaciunt, fugientem sequuntur. spolia Galliarum et Viennensium aurum, pretia laborum suorum, occultare clamitantes, direptis sarcinis tabernacula ducis ipsamque humum pilis et lanceis rimabantur; nam Valens servili veste apud decurionem equitum tegebatur. tum Alfenus Varus praefectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit consilium, vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubae sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. igitur torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti et id ipsum quod nemo regeret paventes; silentio, patientia, postremo precibus ac lacrimis veniam quaerebant. ut vero deformis et flens et praeter spem incolumis Valens processit, gaudium miseratio favor: versi in laetitiam, ut est vulgus utroque immodicum, laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque in tribunal ferunt. ille utili moderatione non supplicium cuiusquam poposcit, ac ne dissimulans suspectior foret, paucos incusavit, gnarus civilibus bellis plus militibus quam ducibus licere.
29.
As these violent protestations gave no sign of abating, Valens sent his lictors among the soldiers to try to contain the sedition, to which they responded by attacking his person, throwing stones at him and chasing him as he fled. They shouted accusations he was hiding the spoils of Gaul and the gold of the Viennese, the price of their own labor. They searched his tent and rummaged through his baggage, even poking the floor of the tent with their javelins and spears, while Valens disguised as a slave, found concealment with a cavalry’s decurion. Then, when the uproar had somewhat cooled, the prefect of the camp, Alfenus Varus, suggested that the centurions be told not to make the rounds and to omit the regulation bugle call summoning the soldiers to their duties. Consequently, all activity stopped. The soldiers looked about them and at one another, stunned, frightened by the very fact that no one was in command. By their silence, by their dejection, and eventually by their prayers and tears they sought forgiveness. Then, when Valens came forward, begrimed and in tears, but unexpectedly unscathed, he was welcomed with joy, pity, and goodwill. There was jubilation all around, as is the way with mobs, always immoderate in their emotions, shifting from one extreme to the other. They praised and congratulated him and surrounded him with the eagles and the standards while carrying him to the tribunal. On his part, he with opportune moderation refrained from punishing anyone and, to avoid raising suspicion by masking his resentment, he reprimanded a few individuals only: he well knew that in civil broils the soldiers must be granted more leeway than their leaders.
XXX.
Munientibus castra apud Ticinum de adversa Caecinae pugna adlatum, et prope renovata seditio tamquam fraude et cunctationibus Valentis proelio defuissent: nolle requiem, non expectare ducem, anteire signa, urgere signiferos; rapido agmine Caecinae iunguntur. improspera Valentis fama apud exercitum Caecinae erat: expositos se tanto pauciores integris hostium viribus querebantur, simul in suam excusationem et adventantium robur per adulationem attollentes, ne ut victi et ignavi despectarentur. et quamquam plus virium, prope duplicatus legionum auxiliorumque numerus erat Valenti, studia tamen militum in Caecinam inclinabant, super benignitatem animi, qua promptior habebatur, etiam vigore aetatis, proceritate corporis et quodam inani favore. hinc aemulatio ducibus: Caecina ut foedum ac maculosum, ille ut tumidum ac vanum inridebant. sed condito odio eandem utilitatem fovere, crebris epistulis sine respectu veniae probra Othoni obiectantes, cum duces partium Othonis quamvis uberrima conviciorum in Vitellium materia abstinerent.
30.
While fortifying their camp near Ticinum, Valens’ army heard of Caecina’s defeat and mutiny almost broke out again, as if they had missed the battle because of Valens’ treachery and temporizing. They no longer wanted rest, refused to wait for their general, went ahead of the standards, hurried the bearers forward, and by forcing the march they swiftly joined up with Caecina. Valens was not popular with Caecina’s troops: they complained that they, a weaker army than Valens’, had to face the full force of the enemy, a grievance intended to excuse them for their defeat and to flatter the newcomers by extolling their might, lest they themselves be looked down as losers and cowards. Although Valens had more troops, in fact nearly twice the number of legions and auxiliaries, the soldiers were more devoted to Caecina, not only for his kindness, which made him appear more accessible, but also because of his youthful vigor, his imposing stature, and some ineffable quality that made him popular. This gave rise to jealousy in the commanders. Caecina mocked Valens as devious and depraved and he Caecina as pompous and a fool. Yet they buried the hatchet [for the time being] and worked for their mutual interest. Renouncing all hopes of pardon [in case of defeat], they both sent frequent messages to Otho casting aspersion and abuse on him, whereas the leaders of Otho’s party abstained from addressing Vitellius in the same manner, although there was abundant matter in him for censure.