LI.
Celeberrimos auctores habeo tantam victoribus adversus fas nefasque inreverentiam fuisse ut gregarius eques occisum a se proxima acie fratrem professus praemium a ducibus petierit. nec illis aut honorare eam caedem ius hominum aut ulcisci ratio belli permittebat. distulerant tamquam maiora meritum quam quae statim exolverentur; nec quidquam ultra traditur. ceterum et prioribus civium bellis par scelus inciderat. nam proelio, quo apud Ianiculum adversus Cinnam pugnatum est, Pompeianus miles fratrem suum, dein cognito facinore se ipsum interfecit, ut Sisenna memorat: tanto acrior apud maiores, sicut virtutibus gloria, ita flagitiis paenitentia fuit. sed haec aliaque ex vetere memoria petita, quotiens res locusque exempla recti aut solacia mali poscet, haud absurde memorabimus.
51.
I have it on best authority that such was the indifference among the victors for right and wrong, that a trooper demanded a reward from his superiors, declaring that in the last battle he had killed his own brother. Common decency precluded them from honoring the bloody deed and military necessity to punish it. So they dismissed him by saying that he deserved a greater payment than they could afford at the moment. Nothing further is told of this ghastly incident, yet a similar crime had occurred before in civil war. As Sisenna relates, in the battle fought against Cinna near the Janiculum, a Pompeian soldier killed his brother, then, on becoming aware of the misdeed, committed suicide. So much keener among our forefathers was the appreciation of both glory in virtuous conduct and of repentance consequent to crime. In any case it will not be improper for me to set down in my work incidents such as this and others borrowed from past history, whenever the matter and the occasion shall require example of goodness or relief from evil.
LII.
Antonio ducibusque partium praemitti equites omnemque Vmbriam explorari placuit, si qua Appennini iuga clementius adirentur: acciri aquilas signaque et quidquid Veronae militum foret, Padumque et mare commeatibus compleri. erant inter duces qui necterent moras: quippe nimius iam Antonius, et certiora ex Muciano sperabantur. namque Mucianus tam celeri victoria anxius et, ni praesens urbe potiretur, expertem se belli gloriaeque ratus, ad Primum et Varum media scriptitabat, instandum coeptis aut rursus cunctandi utilitates disserens atque ita compositus ut ex eventu rerum adversa abnueret vel prospera agnosceret. Plotium Grypum, nuper a Vespasiano in senatorium ordinem adscitum ac legioni praepositum, ceterosque sibi fidos apertius monuit, hique omnes de festinatione Primi ac Vari sinistre et Muciano volentia rescripsere. quibus epistulis Vespasiano missis effecerat ut non pro spe Antonii consilia factaque eius aestimarentur.
52.
Antonius and the other leaders of the Flavian party decided to send the cavalry ahead and explore the whole of Umbria, to see if a fairly accessible passage across the Apennines could be found. The main body of the legions and whatever other troops were still in Verona were also to be sent for and the sea to be filled with supply ships. Among the generals there were some who invented excuses for delay, for Antonius was now growing too powerful, and they felt more assured in their hopes with Mucianus. In fact, the latter was not pleased with the quick success of the campaign. Judging he would have no share in the glory of the war unless he seized Rome in person, he kept writing in non-committal terms to Primus and Varus, expressing now the need to press on with their undertaking, now the wisdom of delaying. In this way he assumed a stance that would allow him, depending on the outcome, to deny responsabitlity for failure or claim credit for success. He revealed more plainly his intentions in his letters to Plotius Grypus, recently added to the senate by Vespasian and appointed commander of a legion, and to other officers faithful to him. In their replies, all of them expressed disapproval of Antonius and Varus for their impetuosity, the very thing Mucianus wanted them to say. By sending these reports to Vespasian, he managed to place Antonius’ decisions and actions in a less favorable light than Antonius himself had expected.
LIII.
Aegre id pati Antonius et culpam in Mucianum conferre, cuius criminationibus eviluissent pericula sua; nec sermonibus temperabat, immodicus lingua et obsequii insolens. litteras ad Vespasianum composuit iactantius quam ad principem, nec sine occulta in Mucianum insectatione: se Pannonicas legiones in arma egisse; suis stimulis excitos Moesiae duces, sua constantia perruptas Alpis, occupatam Italiam, intersepta Germanorum Raetorumque auxilia. quod discordis dispersasque Vitellii legiones equestri procella, mox peditum vi per diem noctemque fudisset, id pulcherrimum et sui operis. casum Cremonae bello imputandum: maiore damno, plurium urbium excidiis veteres civium discordias rei publicae stetisse. non se nuntiis neque epistulis, sed manu et armis imperatori suo militare; neque officere gloriae eorum qui Daciam interim composuerint: illis Moesiae pacem, sibi salutem securitatemque Italiae cordi fuisse; suis exhortationibus Gallias Hispaniasque, validissimam terrarum partem, ad Vespasianum conversas. sed cecidisse in inritum labores si praemia periculorum soli adsequantur qui periculis non adfuerint. nec fefellere ea Mucianum; inde graves simultates, quas Antonius simplicius, Mucianus callide eoque implacabilius nutriebat.
53.
Antonius resented all this and in turn blamed Mucianus, whose insinuations, he said, had belittled the dangers he had faced. Nor was he careful in his use of language, being inherently incapable to control his tongue and unaccustomed to being deferential. He wrote to Vespasian in terms more assertive than are proper when addressing a prince and not without casting veiled aspersion on Mucianus: it was he, Antonius, who had pushed the Pannonian legions to arms, [he said]; it was at his instigation that the Moesian generals had marched; it was his resolve that had forced a passage through the Alps, conquered Italy and barred the way against reinforcements from Germany and Rhetia. If Vitellius’ contentious and scattered legions had been swept away by cavalry as by a violent storm, then routed by the legions’ onslaught lasting one whole day and night, that achievement was not only glorious, it was also his work. The destruction of Cremona was to be imputed to the fortunes of war. Former civil discords had cost the republic greater losses and the ruin of more cities. It was not through couriers and messages, but with sword in hand that he fought for his emperor. He did not seek to cast shadows on the glory of those who meantime had pacified Dacia. They had the peace of Moesia at heart, he the safety and security of Italy. At his urging the most powerful sector of the world, the provinces of Gaul and Spain, had gone over to Vespasian. But so much labor had been for naught if only those who had no share in the danger were to reap its rewards. Antonius’ protestations did not escape Mucianus’ notice and from there arose the bitter enmity the two men nursed against each other, the one openly, the other cunningly, and for that reason more implacably.
LIV.
At Vitellius fractis apud Cremonam rebus nuntios cladis occultans stulta dissimulatione remedia potius malorum quam mala differebat. quippe confitenti consultantique supererant spes viresque: cum e contrario laeta omnia fingeret, falsis ingravescebat. mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium; prohibiti per civitatem sermones, eoque plures ac, si liceret, vere narraturi, quia vetabantur, atrociora vulgaverant. nec duces hostium augendae famae deerant, captos Vitellii exploratores circumductosque, ut robora victoris exercitus noscerent, remittendo; quos omnis Vitellius secreto percontatus interfici iussit. notabili constantia centurio Iulius Agrestis post multos sermones, quibus Vitellium ad virtutem frustra accendebat, perpulit ut ad viris hostium spectandas quaeque apud Cremonam acta forent ipse mitteretur. nec exploratione occulta fallere Antonium temptavit, sed mandata imperatoris suumque animum professus, ut cuncta viseret postulat. missi qui locum proelii, Cremonae vestigia, captas legiones ostenderent. Agrestis ad Vitellium remeavit abnuentique vera esse quae adferret, atque ultro corruptum arguenti ‘quando quidem’ inquit ‘magno documento opus est, nec alius iam tibi aut vitae aut mortis meae usus, dabo cui credas.’ atque ita digressus voluntaria morte dicta firmavit. quidam iussu Vitellii interfectum, de fide constantiaque eadem tradidere.
54.
On the other side, Vitelliuis, his power broken at Cremona, kept hidden the news of the defeat, a foolish dissimulation that postponed the remedy for his ills rather than the ills themselves. For if he had revealed his situation and taken counsel, he still had hopes and forces available. When, on the contrary, he pretended that all was well, he made things worse by his mendacity. Most strange was the silence around him about the war. Mention of it in the city was forbidden and therefore manifold. Those who would have told the truth if permitted, exaggerated the ominous news they spread because of the interdiction. The Flavian leaders, too, were not behind in trying to magnify the rumors. They would take the spies of Vitellius they had captured on a tour of their camps to show the might of the victorious army, and then send them back to Rome. But Vitellius, after interrogating them in secret, had them all executed. A centurion of remarkable integrity, Julius Agrestis, after many interviews in which he tried in vain to put some fire into Vitellius, prevailed on the emperor to have himself sent to ascertain the enemy’s strength and see what had happened at Cremona. Without recourse to spying to fool Antonius, he openly stated his emperor’s wishes and his own intentions and asked permission to view everything. Guides were given him to show the battlefield, the ruins of Cremona, and the captive legions. Agrestis returned to Vitellius and when the latter rejected his report as a string of lies and even alleged that Agrestis had sold out to the enemy, he answered back that since convincing proof was needed and that neither his life nor his death was of further use to his emperor, he would provide him with truly credible evidence. Upon that he left and confirmed his words by taking his own life. Some have reported that he was murdered by Vitellius’ orders, yet even they do not cast doubt on his unstinting fidelity.
LV.
Vitellius ut e somno excitus Iulium Priscum et Alfenum Varum cum quattuordecim praetoriis cohortibus et omnibus equitum alis obsidere Appenninum iubet; secuta e classicis legio. tot milia armatorum, lecta equis virisque, si dux alius foret, inferendo quoque bello satis pollebant. ceterae cohortes ad tuendam urbem L. Vitellio fratri datae: ipse nihil e solito luxu remittens et diffidentia properus festinare comitia, quibus consules in multos annos destinabat; foedera sociis, Latium externis dilargiri; his tributa dimittere, alios immunitatibus iuvare; denique nulla in posterum cura lacerare imperium. sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum hiabat, stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur, apud sapientis cassa habebantur quae neque dari neque accipi salva re publica poterant. tandem flagitante exercitu, qui Mevaniam insederat, magno senatorum agmine, quorum multos ambitione, pluris formidine trahebat, in castra venit, incertus animi et infidis consiliis obnoxius.
55.
Vitellius was awaken as from a deep sleep. He ordered Julius Priscus and Alfenus Varus to hold the Apennines with fourteen praetorian cohorts and the entire cavalry. A legion of marines was sent soon after. So many thousand troops, the best of the cavalry and infantry, were a force sufficient even for an offensive war, had they been under another general. The remaining cohorts were entrusted to Lucius Vitellius, the emperor’s brother, for the defense of the city. Vitellius himself relinquished none of his usual indulgences. Acting with hastiness born of mistrust, he held elections in advance and designated the consuls for several years to come; to allies he liberally granted special treaties and Latin rights to foreigners; to some he remitted the tribute, others he helped by various dispensations. In short, he tore to shreds the fabric of the empire, without thought of the future. The greedy multitude, however, gaped with their mouths open in disbelief at such profusion of gifts. The most foolish paid actual money to buy these favors, whereas the wise viewed as useless privileges what could neither be given nor received without bankrupting the state. Finally, pressed by the army and followed by a long train of senators – several drawn after him by desire to curtsy favor, most of them by fear – he joined his troops camped at Mevania, an irresolute man at the merci of undependable counselors.
LVI.
Contionanti–prodigiosum dictu–tantum foedarum volucrum supervolitavit ut nube atra diem obtenderent. accessit dirum omen, profugus altaribus taurus disiecto sacrificii apparatu, longe, nec ut feriri hostias mos est, confossus. sed praecipuum ipse Vitellius ostentum erat, ignarus militiae, improvidus consilii, quis ordo agminis, quae cura explorandi, quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus, alios rogitans et ad omnis nuntios vultu quoque et incessu trepidus, dein temulentus. postremo taedio castrorum et audita defectione Misenensis classis Romam revertit, recentissimum quodque vulnus pavens, summi discriminis incuriosus. nam cum transgredi Appenninum integro exercitus sui robore et fessos hieme atque inopia hostis adgredi in aperto foret, dum dispergit viris, acerrimum militem et usque in extrema obstinatum trucidandum capiendumque tradidit, peritissimis centurionum dissentientibus et, si consulerentur, vera dicturis. arcuere eos intimi amicorum Vitellii, ita formatis principis auribus ut aspera quae utilia, nec quidquam nisi iucundum et laesurum acciperet.
56.
During his address to the troops a prodigious incident occurred: such a multitude of birds of ill omen flew over Vitellius that they darkened the sky with a black cloud. To this sinister omen was added another: a bull escaping from the altar upset the preparations for a sacrifice and was put down far from the place in a manner not prescribed for the proper killing of victims. But the main prodigy was Vitellius himself, a stranger to the art of war, incapable of decisions, continually asking others about the order of march, the gathering of intelligence, the way in which the war ought to be speeded up or drawn out. At the arrival of every despatch he betrayed confusion in his face and bearing, then sought refuge in drunkenness. In the end, distaste for the camp and tidings of the defection of the fleet at Misenum sent him back to Rome, frightened by every new blow, but disinterested in the final outcome. For though nothing prevented him from crossing the Apennines with fresh, unimpaired troops and fall on a foe weakened by winter and short supplies, he let his forces dissipate and condemned a most valiant army, determined to fight to the finish, to piecemeal slaughter and capture; all this against the better judgement of the most experienced among the centurions, who would have told Vitellius the truth had they been consulted. But his closest friends kept them from gaining access to the emperor, and, in any case, Vitellius’ ears were so molded that he found useful words grating and would listen to nothing but what would please and ruin him.
LVII.
Sed classem Misenensem (tantum civilibus discordiis etiam singulorum audacia valet) Claudius Faventinus centurio per ignominiam a Galba dimissus ad defectionem traxit, fictis Vespasiani epistulis pretium proditionis ostentans. praeerat classi Claudius Apollinaris, neque fidei constans neque strenuus in perfidia; et Apinius Tiro praetura functus ac tum forte Minturnis agens ducem se defectoribus obtulit. a quibus municipia coloniaeque impulsae, praecipuo Puteolanorum in Vespasianum studio, contra Capua Vitellio fida, municipalem aemulationem bellis civilibus miscebant. Vitellius Claudium Iulianum (is nuper classem Misenensem molli imperio rexerat) permulcendis militum animis delegit; data in auxilium urbana cohors et gladiatores, quibus Iulianus praeerat. ut conlata utrimque castra, haud magna cunctatione Iuliano in partis Vespasiani transgresso, Tarracinam occupavere, moenibus situque magis quam ipsorum ingenio tutam.
57.
Claudius Faventinus, a centurion discharged by Galba for ignominious conduct, is a good example of how powerful the audacity of a single man is in civil disorders. It was he who brought the fleet at Misenum to defect, by producing forged letters in Vespasian’s name offering reward for treason. The command of the fleet belonged to Claudius Apollinaris, who was neither staunch in his loyalties nor decisive in his perfidy. Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor, who happened to be at Minturnae, offered himself as a leader to the rebels. These men stirred the local municipalities and colonies into action. The people of Puteoli were strongly in support of Vespasian, whereas Capua remained faithful to Vitellius. Thus, the towns added to the civil wars their local rivalries. Vitellius sent Claudius Julianus, who had headed the fleet at Misenum with relaxed discipline, to pacify the sailors. He was given the support of an urban cohort and of the gladiators who were then under his command. When his forces came face-to-face with those of the rebel sailors, Julianus lost little time in crossing over to Vespasian and together the two sides occupied Terracina, better protected by its walls and position than by the skills of the new defenders.
LVIII.
Quae ubi Vitellio cognita, parte copiarum Narniae cum praefectis praetorii relicta L. Vitellium fratrem cum sex cohortibus et quingentis equitibus ingruenti per Campaniam bello opposuit. ipse aeger animi studiis militum et clamoribus populi arma poscentis refovebatur, dum vulgus ignavum et nihil ultra verba ausurum falsa specie exercitum et legiones appellat. hortantibus libertis (nam amicorum eius quanto quis clarior, minus fidus) vocari tribus iubet, dantis nomina sacramento adigit. superfluente multitudine curam dilectus in consules partitur; servorum numerum et pondus argenti senatoribus indicit. equites Romani obtulere operam pecuniasque, etiam libertinis idem munus ultro flagitantibus. ea simulatio officii a metu profecta verterat in favorem; ac plerique haud proinde Vitellium quam casum locumque principatus miserabantur. nec deerat ipse vultu voce lacrimis misericordiam elicere, largus promissis, et quae natura trepidantium est, immodicus. quin et Caesarem se dici voluit, aspernatus antea, sed tunc superstitione nominis, et quia in metu consilia prudentium et vulgi rumor iuxta audiuntur. ceterum ut omnia inconsulti impetus coepta initiis valida spatio languescunt, dilabi paulatim senatores equitesque, primo cunctanter et ubi ipse non aderat, mox contemptim et sine discrimine donec Vitellius pudore inriti conatus quae non dabantur remisit.
58.
When Vitellius had news of this, he left a part of his forces at Narnia with the prefects of the Praetorian Guard and sent his brother Lucius with six cohorts and five hundred cavalry to oppose the war now spreading across Campania. He himself, though demoralized, felt encouraged by his soldiers’ devotion and the shouts of the people demanding arms: it was only a cowardly rabble, whose courage would never go beyond words, but in his delusion he referred to them as if they were the legions of a real army. At the instances of his freedmen (for of his friends the more notable they were the more he mistrusted them) he had the tribes assemble and all that volunteered were sworn to his service. As their numbers became too large, he divided between the consuls the task of choosing the recruits. Senators were required to furnish slaves and silver. Roman knights contributed services and cash and freedmen even insisted to be accorded the privilege to do the same. This show of devotion, at first born of fear, turned into genuine support for the emperor, yet many felt pity not so much for Vitellius, but for the desperate straits the principate was in. Nor did Vitellius himself, by his looks, his voice, his tears, fail to elicit compassion. He was bountiful with promises, even extravagant, as is in the nature of insecure people. He wanted even to be addressed as Caesar, a title he had refused earlier [when the people had offered it], but which he now accepted because of the religious aura of the name and the fact that, when one is afraid, the counsel of the sages and the talk of the rabble are heeded with equal respect. But, just as resolutions that spring from sudden impulses, no matter how strong at the start fade away in time, senators and knights gradually distanced themselves from him. At first they did it cautiously and when the prince was not present, then with contemptuous indifference, until Vitellius grew ashamed of his pointless efforts and refrained from exacting services that were not offered.
LIX.
Vt terrorem Italiae possessa Mevania ac velut renatum ex integro bellum intulerat, ita haud dubium erga Flavianas partis studium tam pavidus Vitellii discessus addidit. erectus Samnis Paelignusque et Marsi aemulatione quod Campania praevenisset, ut in novo obsequio, ad cuncta belli munia acres erant. sed foeda hieme per transitum Appennini conflictatus exercitus, et vix quieto agmine nives eluctantibus patuit quantum discriminis adeundum foret, ni Vitellium retro fortuna vertisset, quae Flavianis ducibus non minus saepe quam ratio adfuit. obvium illic Petilium Cerialem habuere, agresti cultu et notitia locorum custodias Vitellii elapsum. propinqua adfinitas Ceriali cum Vespasiano, nec ipse inglorius militiae, eoque inter duces adsumptus est. Flavio quoque Sabino ac Domitiano patuisse effugium multi tradidere; et missi ab Antonio nuntii per varias fallendi artis penetrabant, locum ac praesidium monstrantes. Sabinus inhabilem labori et audaciae valetudinem causabatur: Domitiano aderat animus, sed custodes a Vitellio additi, quamquam se socios fugae promitterent, tamquam insidiantes timebantur. atque ipse Vitellius respectu suarum necessitudinum nihil in Domitianum atrox parabat.
59.
In the same way that the occupation of Mevania and the ostensible revival of the war with fresh energy had terrified Italy, so Vitellius’ craven retreat to Rome no doubt boosted favor for Vespasian’s party. The Samnites, the Peligni, and the Marsi were stimulated to new efforts by the example of Campania and were eager to take on all kinds of military assignments, as is natural under a new master. The terrible winter, however, wore down the army while crossing the Apennines. Although the march was almost uneventful, it became clear to these troops floundering in the snow what dangers they would have faced, had not fortune –which stood by the Flavian leaders just as often as their foresight– directed Vitellius back to Rome. On the march they came across Petilius Cerialis, who had eluded Vitellius’ guards by wearing rustic garb and using his knowledge of the country. Closely allied with Vespasian, Cerialis was not without military distinction of his own and was therefore accepted as one of the leaders. Many have said that the opportunity to escape was open also to Sabinus and Domitian. Besides, emissaries sent by Antonius were able to arrive at them by means of various subterfuges and show them where to escape and the protection they would receive. Sabinus excused himself saying that poor health made him unfit for the daring and arduous attempt. Domitian was willing, but he feared that the guards Vitellius had placed over him, even though they promised to join him in the escape, were setting a trap. Yet Vitellius himself, anxious for the fate of those dear to him [in case of defeat], had no hostile intent against Domitian.
LX.
Duces partium ut Carsulas venere, paucos ad requiem dies sumunt, donec aquilae signaque legionum adsequerentur. et locus ipse castrorum placebat, late prospectans, tuto copiarum adgestu, florentissimis pone tergum municipiis; simul conloquia cum Vitellianis decem milium spatio distantibus et proditio sperabatur. aegre id pati miles et victoriam malle quam pacem; ne suas quidem legiones opperiebantur, ut praedae quam periculorum socias. vocatos ad contionem Antonius docuit esse adhuc Vitellio viris, ambiguas, si deliberarent, acris, si desperassent. initia bellorum civilium fortunae permittenda: victoriam consiliis et ratione perfici. iam Misenensem classem et pulcherrimam Campaniae oram descivisse, nec plus e toto terrarum orbe reliquum Vitellio quam quod inter Tarracinam Narniamque iaceat. satis gloriae proelio Cremonensi partum et exitio Cremonae nimium invidiae: ne concupiscerent Romam capere potius quam servare. maiora illis praemia et multo maximum decus, si incolumitatem senatui populoque Romano sine sanguine quaesissent. his ac talibus mitigati animi.
60.
On reaching Carsulae, the Flavian commanders took a few days of rest, while waiting for the main body of the army to come up. They were pleased with the site of the camp itself: the view was extensive, the transport of supplies was assured, and at their back were prosperous communities. At the same time it was hoped to have negotiations with the Vitellians, camped ten miles away, and to convince them to change sides. The plan was not to the soldiers’ liking, who preferred victory to peace. They were even opposed to waiting for their own legions, which would get most of the plunder for a small share of the danger. Antonius had an assembly called and explained to them that Vitellius still had forces available to him, which would remain undecided if given time to reflect, but fight to the death if driven to despair. The outset of a civil war, he said, was in fortune’s hands, but it was carefully thought-out planning that produced final success. Already the fleet at Misenum and the most beautiful coastal areas of Campania had defected; of the whole universe nothing more was left to Vitellius than the stretch of land between Terracina and Narnia. With the battle of Cremona enough glory had fallen to the Flavian army; with the destruction of Cremona too much disgrace. They should not therefore desire to capture Rome more than to save her. For them the recompense would be greater -and the honor by far the greatest- if they assured, without bloodshed, the safety of the Senate and of the Roman people. With these and similar arguments he succeeded in calming the troops.