XXXI.
Sane ante utriusque exitum, quo egregiam Otho famam, Vitellius flagitiosissimam meruere, minus Vitellii ignavae voluptates quam Othonis flagrantissimae libidines timebantur: addiderat huic terrorem atque odium caedes Galbae, contra illi initium belli nemo imputabat. Vitellius ventre et gula sibi inhonestus, Otho luxu saevitia audacia rei publicae exitiosior ducebatur. Coniunctis Caecinae ac Valentis copiis nulla ultra penes Vitellianos mora quin totis viribus certarent: Otho consultavit trahi bellum an fortunam experiri placeret.
31.
It is a fact that before each of the two met his death, by which Otho gained great renown and Vitellius utmost infamy, the slothful indulgences of Vitellius raised less fear than Otho’s consuming passions. The murder of Galba had also made Otho more terrible and odious, whereas no one reproached Vitellius for starting the war. His gluttonous appetite did wrong to his name only, but Otho’s excesses, cruelty, and audacity were seen as a greater danger to the state itself. Now that Caecina and Valens had joined their armies, nothing stood in the way of engaging the enemy with all their forces. Otho, on the other hand, called a council to decide whether they should protract the war or risk all immediately.
XXXII.
Tunc Suetonius Paulinus dignum fama sua ratus, qua nemo illa tempestate militaris rei callidior habebatur, de toto genere belli censere, festinationem hostibus, moram ipsis utilem disseruit: exercitum Vitellii universum advenisse, nec multum virium a tergo, quoniam Galliae tumeant et deserere Rheni ripam inrupturis tam infestis nationibus non conducat; Britannicum militem hoste et mari distineri: Hispanias armis non ita redundare; provinciam Narbonensem incursu classis et adverso proelio contremuisse; clausam Alpibus et nullo maris subsidio transpadanam Italiam atque ipso transitu exercitus vastam; non frumentum usquam exercitui, nec exercitum sine copiis retineri posse: iam Germanos, quod genus militum apud hostis atrocissimum sit, tracto in aestatem bello, fluxis corporibus, mutationem soli caelique haud toleraturos. multa bella impetu valida per taedia et moras evanuisse. contra ipsis omnia opulenta et fida, Pannoniam Moesiam Dalmatiam Orientem cum integris exercitibus, Italiam et caput rerum urbem senatumque et populum, numquam obscura nomina, etiam si aliquando obumbrentur; publicas privatasque opes et immensam pecuniam, inter civilis discordias ferro validiorem; corpora militum aut Italiae sueta aut aestibus; obiacere flumen Padum, tutas viris murisque urbis, e quibus nullam hosti cessuram Placentiae defensione exploratum: proinde duceret bellum. paucis diebus quartam decimam legionem, magna ipsam fama, cum Moesicis copiis adfore: tum rursus deliberaturum et, si proelium placuisset, auctis viribus certaturos.
32.
Suetonius Paulinus felt it was proper for a man of his reputation as the best expert in military matters of his time to give his views on the overall conduct of the war. He explained that haste was to the enemy’s advantage and delay to theirs. The entire Vitellian army had arrived, he said, and could not rely on the forces left behind: the Gallic provinces were in ferment and it was not prudent for Vitellius to abandon the bank of the Rhine to the probable irruptions of such hostile nations [as the Germans]. The British forces were kept from joining him by enemies of their own and by the sea; the Spanish provinces had no forces to spare. Gallia Narbonensis had been taught a lesson by the fleet incursion and by their recent defeat. The parts of Italy north of the Po, closed in by the Alps and deprived of assistance from the sea, had already been depleted by the mere passage of the Vitellian troops: no grain supply anywhere for the army and no army could be maintained without supplies. If the war dragged on until summer, the most redoubtable troops the enemy had, the Germans, would soon find the change of latitude and climate intolerable and their strength drained from them. Many a campaign, successful if decided on a sudden, had come to nothing through tedium and delays. On their own side, on the contrary, everything they had at their disposal was secure and plentiful: Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, the Orient, all with intact armies; they had Italy and Rome, the capital of the world, with the Senate and the people, never empty names, even if at times they might be obscured. They had public and private wealth at their command and immense amount of money, a more powerful resource than steel in civil wars. Their soldiers were physically adapted to Italy’s conditions, [especially] its heat. The Po River was like a safety barrier and the cities [along its banks] were protected by garrisons and strong walls: that not one of them would give in to the enemy had been demonstrated by the defense of Placentia. In view of all this, Paulinus’ conclusion was that Otho must protract the war. In a few days, he said, the famous Fourteenth legion would arrive with the troops from Moesia. They should reconsider the question then and, should they decide to fight, they would do so with augmented strength.
XXXIII.
Accedebat sententiae Paulini Marius Celsus; idem placere Annio Gallo, paucos ante dies lapsu equi adflicto, missi qui consilium eius sciscitarentur rettulerant. Otho pronus ad decertandum; frater eius Titianus et praefectus praetorii Proculus, imperitia properantes, fortunam et deos et numen Othonis adesse consiliis, adfore conatibus testabantur, neu quis obviam ire sententiae auderet, in adulationem concesserant. postquam pugnari placitum, interesse pugnae imperatorem an seponi melius foret dubitavere. Paulino et Celso iam non adversantibus, ne principem obiectare periculis viderentur idem illi deterioris consilii auctores perpulere ut Brixellum concederet ac dubiis proeliorum exemptus summae rerum et imperii se ipsum reservaret. is primus dies Othonianas partis adflixit; namque et cum ipso praetoriarum cohortium et speculatorum equitumque valida manus discessit, et remanentium fractus animus, quando suspecti duces et Otho, cui uni apud militem fides, dum et ipse non nisi militibus credit, imperia ducum in incerto reliquerat.
33.
Marius Celsus concurred with Paulinus and Annius Gallus did the same. The latter had been injured a few days before by a fall from his horse, but those sent to ask for his advice had brought back the answer. Otho was of a mind to fight. His brother Titianus and the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, in a haste borne of ignorance, protested that Fortune, the gods, and Otho’s guardian spirit presided over his decisions, assisting his endeavors. They had taken shelter in flattery to prevent anyone from daring to contradict them. Having opted to fight, they next considered whether it was preferable for the emperor to be present at the battle or to stay away. Paulinus and Celsus now withheld their views, lest they be seen to favor exposing the prince to danger, so the proponents of the ruinous decision to fight now prevailed on him to withdraw to Brixellum, where, safe from the risks of the battle, he would reserve himself for the supreme direction of the war and of the empire. This day first marked the decline of Otho’s fortunes, for not only did he take with him a sizable contingent of praetorian troops, bodyguards, and troopers, but also broke the morale of the army he was turning his back on, because the soldiers suspected the other commanders and Otho, the only man they trusted and by whom they alone were trusted, had left their authority seriously compromised.
XXXIV.
Nihil eorum Vitellianos fallebat, crebris, ut in civili bello, transfugiis; et exploratores cura diversa sciscitandi sua non occultabant. quieti intentique Caecina ac Valens, quando hostis imprudentia rueret, quod loco sapientiae est, alienam stultitiam opperiebantur, inchoato ponte transitum Padi simulantes adversus obpositam gladiatorum manum, ac ne ipsorum miles segne otium tereret. naves pari inter se spatio, validis utrimque trabibus conexae, adversum in flumen dirigebantur, iactis super ancoris quae firmitatem pontis continerent, sed ancorarum funes non extenti fluitabant, ut augescente flumine inoffensus ordo navium attolleretur. claudebat pontem imposita turris et in extremam navem educta, unde tormentis ac machinis hostes propulsarentur. Othoniani in ripa turrim struxerant saxaque et faces iaculabantur.
34.
None of these doings escaped the attention of the Vitellians, there being, as always, no shortage of deserters in civil wars. Besides, spies were not reticent to reveal their own secrets in an effort to ferret out the secrets of the other side. Caecina and Valens quietly waited for the moment when the enemy would heedlessly rush towards ruin, that is, they took advantage of the stupidity of others, a practice that takes the place of wisdom. They had started to build a bridge to simulate their intention to cross the Po and go after the gladiators on the south side of the river; their goal was also to prevent their own troops from wasting their free time in idleness. They positioned boats, pointed upstream, at regular intervals, tied together with strong beams both in front and in the rear; in addition they dropped anchors to reinforce the stability of the bridge, but left the ropes slack, so that, should the river rise, the boats would be lifted without upsetting their disposition. To keep the enemy at bay with catapults and other machines [as the bridge approached the opposite bank], a tower was placed at its end and [progressively] moved out to the last boat [as the line extended]. The Othonians had built a tower of their own on their side of the river, from which they threw stones and incendiary materials.
XXXV.
Et erat insula amne medio, in quam gladiatores navibus molientes, Germani nando praelabebantur. ac forte pluris transgressos completis Liburnicis per promptissimos gladiatorum Macer adgreditur: sed neque ea constantia gladiatoribus ad proelia quae militibus, nec proinde nutantes e navibus quam stabili gradu e ripa vulnera derigebant. et cum variis trepidantium inclinationibus mixti remiges propugnatoresque turbarentur, desilire in vada ultro Germani, retentare puppis, scandere foros aut comminus mergere: quae cuncta in oculis utriusque exercitus quanto laetiora Vitellianis, tanto acrius Othoniani causam auctoremque cladis detestabantur.
35.
There was also an island in the middle of the river and the gladiators were striving towards it in boats, but the Germans stole a march on them by swimming downstream and in fact a large number had already set foot on it. Macer manned some light galleys and went after them, but the gladiators did neither fight with the same steady resolve as the German auxiliaries, nor aim their blows from the wallowing boats as accurately as their enemy from the shore standing firmly on solid ground. And while rowers and combatants were getting in each other’s way on board the galleys and the panicked confusion caused these to flounder about, the Germans seized the advantage and plunging into the shallow waters, grabbed hold of the sterns, clambered up the sides, or strove to scuttle the vessels with whatever came to hand. All this was happening under the eyes of both armies, and the more the Vitellians rejoiced at the sight, the more did the Othonians rail against Macer, the man responsible for the disaster.
XXXVI.
Et proelium quidem, abruptis quae supererant navibus, fuga diremptum: Macer ad exitium poscebatur, iamque vulneratum eminus lancea strictis gladiis invaserant, cum intercursu tribunorum centurionumque protegitur. nec multo post Vestricius Spurinna iussu Othonis, relicto Placentiae modico praesidio, cum cohortibus subvenit. dein Flavium Sabinum consulem designatum Otho rectorem copiis misit, quibus Macer praefuerat, laeto milite ad mutationem ducum et ducibus ob crebras seditiones tam infestam militiam aspernantibus.
36.
The clash was broken off by flight, after the surviving galleys managed to get free from the grip of the enemy. The troops demanded the execution of Macer, already wounded by a spear hurled from afar, and were closing in on him with drawn swords when the tribunes and centurions rushed forward to protect him. Not long after, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho’s orders, arrived with his cohorts, having left behind a modest garrison at Placentia. Then Otho put the consul elect Flavius Sabinus at the head of the troops previously under Macer. The soldiers were pleased with the change of command, but the frequent mutinies made officers regard with disgust a service so ungrateful.
XXXVII.
Invenio apud quosdam auctores pavore belli seu fastidio utriusque principis, quorum flagitia ac dedecus apertiore in dies fama noscebantur, dubitasse exercitus num posito certamine vel ipsi in medium consultarent, vel senatui permitterent legere imperatorem, atque eo duces Othonianos spatium ac moras suasisse, praecipua spe Paulini, quod vetustissimus consularium et militia clarus gloriam nomenque Britannicis expeditionibus meruisset. ego ut concesserim apud paucos tacito voto quietem pro discordia, bonum et innocentem principem pro pessimis ac flagitiosissimis expetitum, ita neque Paulinum, qua prudentia fuit, sperasse corruptissimo saeculo tantam vulgi moderationem reor ut qui pacem belli amore turbaverant, bellum pacis caritate deponerent, neque aut exercitus linguis moribusque dissonos in hunc consensum potuisse coalescere, aut legatos ac duces magna ex parte luxus egestatis scelerum sibi conscios nisi pollutum obstrictumque meritis suis principem passuros.
37.
I find in some authors the notion that the [two] armies, either from fear of war or dislike of both princes, whose deplorable conduct was becoming more apparent with time, had considered whether they should abandon the war and either come to an agreement between themselves or allow the Senate to choose an emperor. For that reason, they say, the Othonian generals had counselled ample delays, especially Paulinus, who hoped he might be chosen, because he was the senior ex-consul and an acclaimed general, who had secured a glorious reputation by his campaigns in Britain. For my part, just as I am ready to admit that, to a few, peace was secretly preferable to war, and a good and just prince to [two of] the worst and most execrable of men, so I also refuse to believe that Paulinus, a sensible man, ever hoped, in an age corrupt to the core, for so much restraint on the part of the common soldiery that they would forswear war for love of peace after disrupting peace for the love of war. Nor [can I believe] that armies so dissimilar in language and customs would come to an understanding of this kind, or that officers and generals, who for the most part were conscious of their own intemperance, insolvency, and misdeeds, could tolerate a prince unless he was depraved and bound to them by debts of gratitude.
XXXVIII.
Vetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque; nam rebus modicis aequalitas facile habebatur. sed ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere. modo turbulenti tribuni, modo consules praevalidi, et in urbe ac foro temptamenta civilium bellorum; mox e plebe infima C. Marius et nobilium saevissimus L. Sulla victam armis libertatem in dominationem verterunt. post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior, et numquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum. non discessere ab armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis civium legiones, nedum Othonis ac Vitellii exercitus sponte posituri bellum fuerint: eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eaedem scelerum causae in discordiam egere. quod singulis velut ictibus transacta sunt bella, ignavia principum factum est. sed me veterum novorumque morum reputatio longius tulit: nunc ad rerum ordinem venio.
38.
Hunger for power, an old and inveterate human trait, intensified and in the end ran riot as the empire expanded. In fact, it was easy to maintain equality when the state was modest, but after the conquest of the world and the destruction of rival cities and kingdoms, when all barriers to the safe pursuit of power were removed, the first clashes between patricians and plebeians broke out. At one time the tribunes were turbulent, at another the consuls overstepped their authority, and one had in Rome and in the Forum the first taste of civil wars. Later Gaius Marius, a plebeian of humble extraction, and Lucius Sulla, the cruellest man among the nobles, triumphed over liberty by force of arms and replaced it with tyranny. After them Gnaeus Pompey, no better man but more subtle. From there on all fighting has been for supreme power. The legions of Roman citizens did not lay down their arms at Pharsalia and Philippi, so it is even less likely that the armies of Otho and Vitellius would have given up fighting voluntarily. The same divine anger, the same human passions, the same incentives to crime drove them to civil war. That these wars were decided by a single blow, as it were, must be ascribed to the ineptitude of the princes. But I have been led astray by considerations of ancient and modern attitudes and now return to an orderly succession of events.
XXXIX.
Profecto Brixellum Othone honor imperii penes Titianum fratrem, vis ac potestas penes Proculum praefectum; Celsus et Paulinus, cum prudentia eorum nemo uteretur, inani nomine ducum alienae culpae praetendebantur; tribuni centurionesque ambigui quod spretis melioribus deterrimi valebant; miles alacer, qui tamen iussa ducum interpretari quam exequi mallet. promoveri ad quartum a Bedriaco castra placuit, adeo imperite ut quamquam verno tempore anni et tot circum amnibus penuria aquae fatigarentur. ibi de proelio dubitatum, Othone per litteras flagitante ut maturarent, militibus ut imperator pugnae adesset poscentibus: plerique copias trans Padum agentis acciri postulabant. nec proinde diiudicari potest quid optimum factu fuerit, quam pessimum fuisse quod factum est.
39.
After Otho left for Brixellum, the prestige of command belonged to his brother Titianus, but effective power was in the hands of the prefect Proculus. Celsus and Paulinus, generals in name only whose expertise no one used, served merely as cover for the blunders of others. Tribunes and centurions were mystified to see their best commanders slighted and the worst in charge. The soldiers were keen enough, yet they tended to question rather than obey the orders of their leaders. It was decided to march forward and set up camp four miles from Bedriacum, but the move was executed with such incompetence that the troops suffered from lack of water, even though it was spring and they were surrounded by rivers. There they debated whether they should engage, as Otho in his messages kept urging speedy action, whereas the soldiers kept demanding that the emperor be with them at the battle, many even insisting that the troops still operating on the south side of the Po should join them. So it is not in the same degree possible to judge what they should have done as is to say that whatever was done was the worst course of action.
XL.
Non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti confluentis Padi et Ardae fluminum, sedecim inde milium spatio distantis, petebant. Celso et Paulino abnuentibus militem itinere fessum, sarcinis gravem obicere hosti, non omissuro quo minus expeditus et vix quattuor milia passuum progressus aut incompositos in agmine aut dispersos et vallum molientis adgrederetur, Titianus et Proculus, ubi consiliis vincerentur, ad ius imperii transibant. aderat sane citus equo Numida cum atrocibus mandatis, quibus Otho increpita ducum segnitia rem in discrimen mitti iubebat, aeger mora et spei impatiens.
40.
They set out to reach the confluence of the Po and the Adda River, sixteen miles away, not as if going into battle but rather embarking on a long campaign. Celsus and Paulinus refused to throw their men, exhausted by the march and weighed down by their packs, at the enemy, who, in light fighting trim and with barely four miles of march behind them, would not fail to swoop down on Otho’s troops while strung out on the march, or dispersed and intent on fortifying the camp. But Titianus and Proculus, when worsted by sound judgement, always had recourse to their imperial authority. It is a fact, however, that a Numidian courier riding flat-out had arrived with a scathing message from Otho, in which he reviled the generals’ inertness and demanded that the issue be brought to a test, being sick of delays and disgusted with mere hopes only.