XCI.
Apud civitatem cuncta interpretantem funesti ominis loco acceptum est quod maximum pontificatum adeptus Vitellius de caerimoniis publicis XV kalendas Augustas edixisset, antiquitus infausto die Cremerensi Alliensique cladibus: adeo omnis humani divinique iuris expers, pari libertorum amicorum socordia, velut inter temulentos agebat. sed comitia consulum cum candidatis civiliter celebrans omnem infimae plebis rumorem in theatro ut spectator, in circo ut fautor adfectavit: quae grata sane et popularia, si a virtutibus proficiscerentur, memoria vitae prioris indecora et vilia accipiebantur. ventitabat in senatum, etiam cum parvis de rebus patres consulerentur. ac forte Priscus Helvidius praetor designatus contra studium eius censuerat. commotus primo Vitellius, non tamen ultra quam tribunos plebis in auxilium spretae potestatis advocavit; mox mitigantibus amicis, qui altiorem iracundiam eius verebantur, nihil novi accidisse respondit quod duo senatores in re publica dissentirent; solitum se etiam Thraseae contra dicere. inrisere plerique impudentiam aemulationis; aliis id ipsum placebat quod neminem ex praepotentibus, sed Thraseam ad exemplar verae gloriae legisset.
91.
In a city ready to see hidden meaning in all things, it was regarded as an evil omen that Vitellius, upon becoming pontifex maximus, had issued an edict in regard to public ceremonies on the 18th of July, since ancient times an unpropitious day on account of the defeat at the Cremera and Allia rivers. To this point was he ignorant of civil and religious customs, and surrounded as he was by friends and freedmen equally heedless, he seemed to live among drunkards. Yet he was present with the candidates at the consular elections like an ordinary citizen, mingled with the spectators at the theater, and cheered his team at the circus, eager to win any audible sign of approval from the rabble. Had this behavior proceeded from virtue, it would undoubtedly have met with favor and gained him popularity, but the memory of his past life made it seem unworthy and base. He frequently came to the Senate even when nothing of moment was being discussed. It once came about that the praetor-elect Helvidius Priscus had expressed an opinion contrary to his wishes. Vitellius was shocked at first, but went no further than to call the tribunes in support of his slighted authority. Later, when his friends tried to soften him for fear of a deeper resentment, he answered that it was not the first time two senators differed on matters of state, adding that he himself had often contradicted Thrasea. Most found the impudence of such a comparison ridiculous, but others were pleased that Vitellius had chosen Thrasea as his model of true nobility, and not some mighty political figure.
XCII.
Praeposuerat praetorianis Publilium Sabinum a praefectura cohortis, Iulium Priscum tum centurionem: Priscus Valentis, Sabinus Caecinae gratia pollebant; inter discordis Vitellio nihil auctoritas. munia imperii Caecina ac Valens obibant, olim anxii odiis, quae bello et castris male dissimulata pravitas amicorum et fecunda gignendis inimicitiis civitas auxerat, dum ambitu comitatu et immensis salutantium agminibus contendunt comparanturque, variis in hunc aut illum Vitellii inclinationibus; nec umquam satis fida potentia, ubi nimia est: simul ipsum Vitellium, subitis offensis aut intempestivis blanditiis mutabilem, contemnebant metuebantque. nec eo segnius invaserant domos hortos opesque imperii, cum flebilis et egens nobilium turba, quos ipsos liberosque patriae Galba reddiderat, nulla principis misericordia iuvarentur. gratum primoribus civitatis etiam plebs adprobavit, quod reversis ab exilio iura libertorum concessisset, quamquam id omni modo servilia ingenia corrumpebant, abditis pecuniis per occultos aut ambitiosos sinus, et quidam in domum Caesaris transgressi atque ipsis dominis potentiores.
92.
Publius Sabinus, a cohort prefect, was made commander of the Praetorian Guard, together with Julius Priscus, then a centurion. Priscus and Sabinus owed their promotion the first to Valens and the other to Caecina. The rivalry between Valens and Caecina left Vitellius no authority. All the functions of the state were carried out by the two, who mistrusted each other from ancient mutual hatred, hardly concealed in the camp during the war and now exacerbated by perverse friends and by the civil climate in Rome, always ready to instigate new feuds. While Caecina and Valens vied for supremacy and invited comparison as to the amount of homage each received, the size of his retinues, the length of the interminable processions of clients in waiting, Vitellius’ favor wavered between the two. Power is never too reliable when excessive and both feared and despised the emperor himself, who could easily pass from untimely cajolery to sudden irritability. That did not make them less hesitant to seize upon the palaces, gardens, and riches of the empire, while a pitiable multitude of dispossessed nobles, whom Galba had restored to their place in society, together with their children, found no compassionate relief from the emperor. A measure agreeable to the city leaders, which even earned the approval of the populace, was the one by which Vitellius restored to those returning from exile the rights over their freedmen. These, however, circumvented the provision in every possible way by servile trickery, such as having their money kept out of sight in the pockets of obscure friends or of powerful protectors. Some of these freedmen even found their way into the imperial household, often becoming more powerful than their masters.
XCIII.
Sed miles, plenis castris et redundante multitudine, in porticibus aut delubris et urbe tota vagus, non principia noscere, non servare vigilias neque labore firmari: per inlecebras urbis et inhonesta dictu corpus otio, animum libidinibus imminuebant. postremo ne salutis quidem cura infamibus Vaticani locis magna pars tetendit, unde crebrae in vulgus mortes; et adiacente Tiberi Germanorum Gallorumque obnoxia morbis corpora fluminis aviditas et aestus impatientia labefecit. insuper confusus pravitate vel ambitu ordo militiae: sedecim praetoriae, quattuor urbanae cohortes scribebantur, quis singula milia inessent. plus in eo dilectu Valens audebat, tamquam ipsum Caecinam periculo exemisset. sane adventu eius partes convaluerant, et sinistrum lenti itineris rumorem prospero proelio verterat. omnisque inferioris Germaniae miles Valentem adsectabatur, unde primum creditur Caecinae fides fluitasse.
93.
Meanwhile the soldiery, a vast multitude overflowing the congested camp, loitered under the porticoes, in the temples, and everywhere in the city. No more roll-calls for them, no guard duties, no work to keep them fit for service. The seductions of Rome and indulgence in excesses too shameful to mention eroded their physical strength through idleness and their morale through debauchery. In the end they became careless of their own lives, for most of them ended up camping in the mephitic district around the Vatican hill with ensuing high mortality in the ranks. Intolerance of heat and excessive attraction to the waters of the nearby Tiber weakened the bodies of German and Gallic soldiers, naturally prone to infection. To make matters worse, there was confusion in the regular order of military service either through mismanagement or corruption. [Counter to well-established precedent, no less than] sixteen praetorian and four urban cohorts were being levied with an effective strength of one thousand men each. Valens arrogated to himself a leading role in raising these troops, claiming he had saved Caecina’s life from danger [at the battle of Bedriacum]. That the Vitellian side had been heartened by his arrival, that the victory had proven false the ugly rumors accompanying his slow advance into Italy, was a fact beyond doubt, and all the troops of Lower Germany were enthusiastically in Valens’ favor. It is thought that it was at this point that Caecina’s loyalty first began to weaken.
XCIV.
Ceterum non ita ducibus indulsit Vitellius ut non plus militi liceret. sibi quisque militiam sumpsere: quamvis indignus, si ita maluerat, urbanae militiae adscribebatur; rursus bonis remanere inter legionarios aut alaris volentibus permissum. nec deerant qui vellent, fessi morbis et intemperiem caeli incusantes; robora tamen legionibus alisque subtracta, convulsum castrorum decus, viginti milibus e toto exercitu permixtis magis quam electis. Contionante Vitellio postulantur ad supplicium Asiaticus et Flavus et Rufinus duces Galliarum, quod pro Vindice bellassent. nec coercebat eius modi voces Vitellius: super insitam [mortem] animo ignaviam conscius sibi instare donativum et deesse pecuniam omnia alia militi largiebatur. liberti principum conferre pro numero mancipiorum ut tributum iussi: ipse sola perdendi cura stabula aurigis extruere, circum gladiatorum ferarumque spectaculis opplere, tamquam in summa abundantia pecuniae inludere.
94.
Vitellius leniency towards his generals was exceeded by the license he accorded his soldiers. Everyone chose the branch of service he preferred. Even if unfit [for army service], he was enrolled in the urban militia, if that was his wish. Good soldiers, on their side, if they wanted to remain with the legions or the auxiliary cavalry, were permitted to do so. Many, in fact, who were in poor health and blamed the [Italian] climate chose that option. Nonetheless the legions and the cavalry lost their best elements and the prestige of the [praetorian] camp was ruined by the influx of twenty thousand men haphazardly taken in rather than carefully selected from the entire army. During a formal address to the troops, Vitellius was pressed for the execution of Asiaticus, Flavus and Rufinus, three Gallic chiefs accused of having fought for Vindex. He did not try to repress demands of this kind. Beside being a coward at heart, he also felt the menace of the donative hanging over him, and having no money to pay for it, he gave in to the soldiers in all other respects. The richest freedmen were required to contribute a sum proportional to the number of slaves they owned. As for Vitellius himself, whose only passion was to squander, he kept building stables for his chariot drivers, filling the arena with shows of gladiators and wild beasts, throwing away money at play as if he were swimming in it.
XCV.
Quin et natalem Vitellii diem Caecina ac Valens editis tota urbe vicatim gladiatoribus celebravere, ingenti paratu et ante illum diem insolito. laetum foedissimo cuique apud bonos invidiae fuit quod extructis in campo Martio aris inferias Neroni fecisset. caesae publice victimae cremataeque; facem Augustales subdidere, quod sacerdotium, ut Romulus Tatio regi, ita Caesar Tiberius Iuliae genti sacravit. nondum quartus a victoria mensis, et libertus Vitellii Asiaticus Polyclitos Patrobios et vetera odiorum nomina aequabat. nemo in illa aula probitate aut industria certavit: unum ad potentiam iter, prodigis epulis et sumptu ganeaque satiare inexplebilis Vitellii libidines. ipse abunde ratus si praesentibus frueretur, nec in longius consultans, noviens miliens sestertium paucissimis mensibus intervertisse creditur. magna et misera civitas, eodem anno Othonem Vitellium passa, inter Vinios Fabios Icelos Asiaticos varia et pudenda sorte agebat, donec successere Mucianus et Marcellus et magis alii homines quam alii mores.
95.
What is more, Caecina and Valens celebrated Vitellius’ birthday by holding gladiatorial shows given by district in the entire city, a grandiose apparatus on a scale never seen before. By erecting altars in the Campus Martius and offering a sacrifice to the spirit of Nero, he delighted the rabble but scandalized all decent citizens. Victims were immolated and burnt at public expense; the Augustales themselves, the priestly order emperor Tiberius [had] consecrated to the Julian clan as Romulus had done for king Tatius, applying the torch. Not quite four months had passed since the victory [at Bedriacum] and already Vitellius’ freedman Asiaticus was proving the equal of scoundrels like Polyclitus or Patrobius and the other execrable names of earlier days. No one in Vitellius’ court tried to excel by honesty and diligence. Only one was the way to advancement, to satiate Vitellius’ boundless appetites by providing sumptuous banquets and ruinous gastronomic extravaganzas. Quite content with immediate gratification and heedless of the future, he alone swallowed up nine hundred million sesterces in only a very few months. Rome, the great but unhappy city had within one year to submit to an Otho, a Vitellius, and pass through the hands of men like Vinius, Fabius, Icelus, Asiaticus in a climate full of uncertainties and shame, until they were displaced by Mucianus and Marcellus, that is, by other men rather than by other morals.
XCVI.
Prima Vitellio tertiae legionis defectio nuntiatur, missis ab Aponio Saturnino epistulis, antequam is quoque Vespasiani partibus adgregaretur; sed neque Aponius cuncta, ut trepidans re subita, perscripserat, et amici adulantes mollius interpretabantur: unius legionis eam seditionem, ceteris exercitibus constare fidem. in hunc modum etiam Vitellius apud milites disseruit, praetorianos nuper exauctoratos insectatus, a quibus falsos rumores dispergi, nec ullum civilis belli metum adseverabat, suppresso Vespasiani nomine et vagis per urbem militibus qui sermones populi coercerent. id praecipuum alimentum famae erat.
96.
The first defection reported to Vitellius was that of the Third legion, the news arriving in a letter sent by Aponius Saturninus before he also went over to Vespasian. But Aponius, in the alarm caused by the sudden turn of events, had not given all details of the defection, and Vitellius’ courtiers, in their desire to please, represented to him the facts in a less somber light, saying that the mutiny affected one legion only and that loyalty remained unshaken in the rest of the army. Vitellius himself harangued the soldiers along the same lines and reviled the praetorians, whom he had lately discharged, accusing them of circulating false rumors. He assured the troops that there was no danger of civil war breaking out again. He made no mention of Vespasian and had soldiers roam the streets to kep the populace from talking, a measure which more than anything else fed the rumors.
XCVII.
Auxilia tamen e Germania Britanniaque et Hispaniis excivit, segniter et necessitatem dissimulans. perinde legati provinciaeque cunctabantur, Hordeonius Flaccus suspectis iam Batavis anxius proprio bello, Vettius Bolanus numquam satis quieta Britannia, et uterque ambigui. neque ex Hispaniis properabatur, nullo tum ibi consulari: trium legionum legati, pares iure et prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam eius fortunam ex aequo detrectabant. in Africa legio cohortesque delectae a Clodio Macro, mox a Galba dimissae, rursus iussu Vitellii militiam cepere; simul cetera iuventus dabat impigre nomina. quippe integrum illic ac favorabilem proconsulatum Vitellius, famosum invisumque Vespasianus egerat: proinde socii de imperio utriusque coniectabant, sed experimentum contra fuit.
97.
Nonetheless he sent for reinforcements from Germany, Britain, and Spain, but without hurry, to conceal the need he had of them. The governors and the provinces were just as slow. Suspicious of the Batavi, Hordeonius Flaccus was afraid of a possible war of his own. Vettius Bolanus never enjoyed real peace in Britain, and both he and Flaccus wavered in their loyalty. Neither was help coming any faster from Spain: there was no consular governor there and the three legion commanders, who held equal authority and would have fought one another in their zeal to oblige Vitellius, had things gone well for him, now alike recoiled from sharing his ill fortune. In Africa the legion and the cohorts raised by Clodius Macer, then disbanded by Galba, resumed service on Vitellius’ orders. At the same time the rest of the men of military age sought enlistment with alacrity. In fact, Vitellius had governed the province as proconsul with integrity and public approval, whereas Vespasian had left behind a bad name and much resentment. Based on their experience, the African allies formed their opinion as to the kind of emperor either man would be, but the facts gave them the lie.
XCVIII.
Ac primo Valerius Festus legatus studia provincialium cum fide iuvit; mox nutabat, palam epistulis edictisque Vitellium, occultis nuntiis Vespasianum fovens et haec illave defensurus, prout invaluissent. deprehensi cum litteris edictisque Vespasiani per Raetiam et Gallias militum et centurionum quidam ad Vitellium missi necantur: plures fefellere, fide amicorum aut suomet astu occultati. ita Vitellii paratus noscebantur, Vespasiani consiliorum pleraque ignota, primum socordia Vitellii, dein Pannonicae Alpes praesidiis insessae nuntios retinebant. mare quoque etesiarum flatu in Orientem navigantibus secundum, inde adversum erat.
98.
At first Valerius Festus, the military commander, loyally supported the goodwill of the provincials, but soon began to play a double game, overtly favoring Vitellius in his letters and public pronouncements and Vespasian in secret communications, ready to take up arms for one party or the other, depending on the success of either. Some of the soldiers and centurions sent with letters and edicts from Vespasian to all parts of Rhaetia and Gaul were intercepted, sent to Vitellius, and executed. Many escaped capture, either assisted by loyal friends or using their own ingenuity in hiding. In this way Vitellius’ moves became known while Vespasian’s were not, mainly owing to Vitellius’ lack of initiative and also to the fact that the Pannonian Alps, provided with garrisons, blocked communications. Besides, the Mediterrenean was favorable to travelers going east, but not so to those going the other way because of the contrary etesian winds.
XCIX.
Tandem inruptione hostium atrocibus undique nuntiis exterritus Caecinam ac Valentem expedire ad bellum iubet. praemissus Caecina, Valentem e gravi corporis morbo tum primum adsurgentem infirmitas tardabat. longe alia proficiscentis ex urbe Germanici exercitus species: non vigor corporibus, non ardor animis; lentum et rarum agmen, fluxa arma, segnes equi; impatiens solis pulveris tempestatum, quantumque hebes ad sustinendum laborem miles, tanto ad discordias promptior. accedebat huc Caecinae ambitio vetus, torpor recens, nimia fortunae indulgentia soluti in luxum, seu perfidiam meditanti infringere exercitus virtutem inter artis erat. credidere plerique Flavii Sabini consiliis concussam Caecinae mentem, ministro sermonum Rubrio Gallo: rata apud Vespasianum fore pacta transitionis. simul odiorum invidiaeque erga Fabium Valentem admonebatur ut impar apud Vitellium gratiam virisque apud novum principem pararet.
99.
Panic at the alarming news coming in from all sides of enemy inroads finally induced Vitellius to order Caecina and Valens to gear up for war. Caecina was sent on ahead, as Valens, just recovering from a serious illness, was delayed by convalescence. The appearance of the army of Germany was now quite different [from what it had been but lately on entering Rome]: no physical vigor, no martial ardor; their marching was slow and their columns irregular, their weapons dragging, their horses spent. Intolerant of the sun, the dust, the heat of the Italian summer, the men were as unfit to endure hard work as they were all the more prone to insubordination. An added problem was Caecina himself [who was not enforcing discipline]: he had always courted popularity with the troops, but recently a torpor had stolen over him, either because the excess of good fortune had dissipated his energy in luxury or because he was already meditating treason, and undermining the army’s fighting spirit was part of his plan. Many believed that the counsel of Flavius Sabinus had perverted Caecina’s mind and that the intermediary in the negotiations had been Rubrius Gallus, [who assured Caecina] that the terms of his defection would be approved by Vepasian. Caecina was also put in mind of the hatred and resentment he felt against Fabius Valens: as he was unequal to his rival in Vitellius’ eyes, he would do well to gain the credit and support of a new prince.
C.
Caecina e complexu Vitellii multo cum honore digressus partem equitum ad occupandam Cremonam praemisit. mox vexilla primae, quartae, quintaedecimae, sextaedecimae legionum, dein quinta et duoetvicensima secutae; postremo agmine unaetvicensima Rapax et prima Italica incessere cum vexillariis trium Britannicarum legionum et electis auxiliis. profecto Caecina scripsit Fabius Valens exercitui, quem ipse ductaverat, ut in itinere opperiretur: sic sibi cum Caecina convenisse. qui praesens eoque validior mutatum id consilium finxit ut ingruenti bello tota mole occurreretur. ita adcelerare legiones Cremonam, pars Hostiliam petere iussae: ipse Ravennam devertit praetexto classem adloquendi; mox Patavii secretum componendae proditionis quaesitum. namque Lucilius Bassus post praefecturam alae Ravennati simul ac Misenensi classibus a Vitellio praepositus, quod non statim praefecturam praetorii adeptus foret, iniquam iracundiam flagitiosa perfidia ulciscebatur. nec sciri potest traxeritne Caecinam, an, quod evenit inter malos ut et similes sint, eadem illos pravitas impulerit.
100.
Upon being warmly embraced by Vitellius and receiving much commendation, Caecina started on his campaign and sent a part of his cavalry ahead to occupy Cremona. Soon after, the units of the First, Fourth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth legion left, followed by the Fifth and Twenty-second legions. At the end of the column came the Twenty-first Rapax and the First Italica, with detachments of three legions from Britain and the pick of the auxiliaries. After Caecina’s departure, Fabius Valens wrote to that part of the army that he had himself commanded to wait for him on the way, that being the agreement [he said] he had with Caecina. But Caecina, being with the army and therefore commanding more authority, pretended the plan had been altered to counter the onset of the enemy with full force. Thus the army was ordered to quicken its pace and one part to head for Cremona and the other to Hostilia. Caecina himself made a detour to Ravenna on the pretext of intending to harangue the fleet. Soon later he sought the seclusion of Patavium to arrange his betrayal. In fact, Lucilius Bassus, although he had been promoted by Vitellius from simple prefect of a cavalry regiment to the command of both the Adriatic and Mediterrenean fleets, was eager to soothe by an outrageous act of perfidy his irrational indignation at not being immediately made prefect of the Praetorian Guard. It will never be known whether Bassus led Caecina astray or whether –evil men being very much alike – the same perverse motives prompted them both.
CI.
Scriptores temporum, qui potiente rerum Flavia domo monimenta belli huiusce composuerunt, curam pacis et amorem rei publicae, corruptas in adulationem causas, tradidere: nobis super insitam levitatem et prodito Galba vilem mox fidem aemulatione etiam invidiaque, ne ab aliis apud Vitellium anteirentur, pervertisse ipsum Vitellium videntur. Caecina legiones adsecutus centurionum militumque animos obstinatos pro Vitellio variis artibus subruebat: Basso eadem molienti minor difficultas erat, lubrica ad mutandam fidem classe ob memoriam recentis pro Othone militiae.
101.
The historians of the time who wrote the chronicle of this war while the Flavian house was in power, in their eagerness to flatter have ascribed distorted motives [to Caecina and Bassus], such as concern for peace and love of country. Apart from their natural inconstancy and the low esteem in which they held their oath soon after betraying Galba, it seems to me that it was emulation and even envy at being preceded by others in Vitellius’affections that pushed them to overthrow him. Caecina rejoined the legions and tried in every possible way to subvert the stubborn attachment of centurions and soldiers to Vitellius. Bassus had less problems in performing the same task, as the fleet was ready to defect, the memory of their service to Otho being still fresh in the sailors’ minds.