I.
Meliore fato fideque partium Flavianarum duces consilia belli tractabant. Poetovionem in hiberna tertiae decimae legionis convenerant. illic agitavere placeretne obstrui Pannoniae Alpes, donec a tergo vires universae consurgerent, an ire comminus et certare pro Italia constantius foret. quibus opperiri auxilia et trahere bellum videbatur, Germanicarum legionum vim famamque extollebant, et advenisse mox cum Vitellio Britannici exercitus robora: ipsis nec numerum parem pulsarum nuper legionum, et quamquam atrociter loquerentur, minorem esse apud victos animum. sed insessis interim Alpibus venturum cum copiis Orientis Mucianum; superesse Vespasiano mare, classis, studia provinciarum, per quas velut alterius belli molem cieret. ita salubri mora novas viris adfore, ex praesentibus nihil periturum.
1.
The leaders of the Flavian party hammered out their plans with greater success in a spirit of mutual trust. They met at Poetovio, the winter quarters of the Thirteenth legion. There they had a heated debate as to whether they should block the Pannonian Alps, until the entire strength of their army was massed behind them, or whether the bolder move would be to close with the enemy [at once] and fight for the control of Italy. Those who were in favor of waiting for reinforcements and extending the duration of the war stressed the might and reputation of the German legions and the recent arrival with Vitellius of the elite of the British army. But if they occupied in the meantime the Alps, Mucianus would soon arrive with the forces of the Orient. Besides, control of the sea was in Vespasian’s hands; he had fleets and provinces supporting him, from which he could muster up enough resources to virtually start another war. So, by a prudent delay, new forces would join them and none of those now available would be lost.
II.
Ad ea Antonius Primus (is acerrimus belli concitator) festinationem ipsis utilem, Vitellio exitiosam disseruit. plus socordiae quam fiduciae accessisse victoribus; neque enim in procinctu et castris habitos: per omnia Italiae municipia desides, tantum hospitibus metuendos, quanto ferocius ante se egerint, tanto cupidius insolitas voluptates hausisse. circo quoque ac theatris et amoenitate urbis emollitos aut valetudinibus fessos: sed addito spatio rediturum et his robur meditatione belli; nec procul Germaniam, unde vires; Britanniam freto dirimi, iuxta Gallias Hispaniasque, utrimque viros equos tributa, ipsamque Italiam et opes urbis; ac si inferre arma ultro velint, duas classis vacuumque Illyricum mare. quid tum claustra montium profutura? quid tractum in aestatem aliam bellum? unde interim pecuniam et commeatus? quin potius eo ipso uterentur quod Pannonicae legiones deceptae magis quam victae resurgere in ultionem properent, Moesici exercitus integras viris attulerint. si numerus militum potius quam legionum putetur, plus hinc roboris, nihil libidinum; et profuisse disciplinae ipsum pudorem: equites vero ne tum quidem victos, sed quamquam rebus adversis disiectam Vitellii aciem. ‘duae tunc Pannonicae ac Moesicae alae perrupere hostem: nunc sedecim alarum coniuncta signa pulsu sonituque et nube ipsa operient ac superfundent oblitos proeliorum equites equosque. nisi quis retinet, idem suasor auctorque consilii ero. vos, quibus fortuna in integro est, legiones continete: mihi expeditae cohortes sufficient. iam reseratam Italiam, impulsas Vitellii res audietis. iuvabit sequi et vestigiis vincentis insistere.’
2.
Antonius Primus, the most ardent advocate of the war, refuted these arguments, contending that immediate action would serve their own ends and destroy Vitellius. Success, [he argued], had demoralized the victors, rather than give them confidence, for their soldiers were not even kept in camps, let alone in fighting trim. Instead, they were roaming idly about in every municipal town in Italy, formidable only to their hosts. The more brutish had their lives been before, the more avidly they had drank of the unfamiliar pleasures. Also, the circus, the theater, the enticements of the city had softened them or sickness had sapped their stamina. But given more time even they would regain strength in getting ready for war. Germany, the wellhead of their power, was not far; Britain was separated only by a narrow arm of the sea; Gaul and Spain were within easy reach and in both they could find men, horses, money. Then there was Italy itself and Rome with her wealth. If they decided to go on the offensive, they had two fleets and undisputed mastery of the Adriatic Sea. Of what use would the mountain barriers then be to themselves? What would be the advantage of delaying the war until the following summer? Where would money and supplies come from in the meantime? Why not instead turn to their profit the very fact that the Pannonian legions, cheated rather than beaten in the field, were itching to have their revenge and that the Moesian army had joined them with undiminished forces? If they reckoned the number of troops rather than of legions, they had greater strength on their side and better discipline. Indeed the shame of the defeat at Bedriacum had improved discipline. Moreover, the cavalry had not been bested even on that occasion: though the battle was lost, they had broken through Vitellius’ line. ‘On that day’, Antonius cried out, ‘two regiments of Pannonian and Moesian cavalry forced a passage through the enemy: now the combined forces of sixteen regiments, by the rush and roar of their charge, by the very storm of dust they raise, will submerge and crush men and horses no longer used to fighting. Unless someone prevents me, I myself will be both proponent and executor of this plan. You, who have not yet burnt your bridges, stay here with your legions. I need only the auxiliary cohorts in light marching orders. You shall soon hear that the doors of Italy have been thrown open and that Vitellius’ fate has been sealed. You will be happy enough to follow and tread in the victor’s footsteps.’
III.
Haec ac talia flagrans oculis, truci voce, quo latius audiretur (etenim se centuriones et quidam militum consilio miscuerant), ita effudit ut cautos quoque ac providos permoveret, vulgus et ceteri unum virum ducemque, spreta aliorum segnitia, laudibus ferrent. hanc sui famam ea statim contione commoverat, qua recitatis Vespasiani epistulis non ut plerique incerta disseruit, huc illuc tracturus interpretatione, prout conduxisset: aperte descendisse in causam videbatur, eoque gravior militibus erat culpae vel gloriae socius.
3.
These and similar sentiments Antonius poured out in a stream of words with fiery eyes and – to be heard from farther away – with thundering voice (for centurions and some soldiers had crowded around during the meeting). He spoke with such passion that he won over to his side even the prudent and far-sighted members of the audience, while the rest and the troops in general scoffed at the timidity of the other officers and hailed him as the one true man among them and the only leader. He had quickly gained this reputation for himself in a general assembly of the soldiers, in which Vespasian’s letters were first read. Unlike most of the others, he had not spoken in riddles with the intention of assigning this or that meaning to his words, to suit the turn of later events. Instead he was seen as having openly embraced Vespasian’s cause, therefore he carried more weight with the soldiers, for he was party to their crime or their glory.
IV.
Proxima Cornelii Fusci procuratoris auctoritas. is quoque inclementer in Vitellium invehi solitus nihil spei sibi inter adversa reliquerat. Tampius Flavianus, natura ac senecta cunctator, suspiciones militum inritabat, tamquam adfinitatis cum Vitellio meminisset; idemque, quod coeptante legionum motu profugus, dein sponte remeaverat, perfidiae locum quaesisse credebatur. nam Flavianum, omissa Pannonia ingressum Italiam et discrimini exemptum, rerum novarum cupido legati nomen resumere et misceri civilibus armis impulerat, suadente Cornelio Fusco, non quia industria Flaviani egebat, sed ut consulare nomen surgentibus cum maxime partibus honesta specie praetenderetur.
4.
Next to Antonius, the procurator Cornelius Fuscus was most influential. A persistent reviler of Vitellius, he had also left himself no escape should the outcome prove unfavorable. Tempius Flavianus, [the governor of Pannonia], whose character and advanced age made him less resolute, aroused the distrust of the soldiers, who suspected him of not forgetting his family ties with Vitellius. Besides, since he had run away when the legions first rose and had later come back of his own accord, the troops ascribed his return to some treacherous scheme [against Vespasian]. He had in fact left Pannonia and repaired to Italy, where he could have safely kept out of harm’s way, when the desire for political change had prompted him to resume his post as governor and reenter the thick of civil wars. Cornelius Fuscus had prevailed on him to do this, not because he needed his industry, but rather to invest the fledgling Flavian party with the high respectability of a consular name.
V.
Ceterum ut transmittere in Italiam impune et usui foret, scriptum Aponio Saturnino, cum exercitu Moesico celeraret. ac ne inermes provinciae barbaris nationibus exponerentur, principes Sarmatarum Iazugum, penes quos civitatis regimen, in commilitium adsciti. plebem quoque et vim equitum, qua sola valent, offerebant: remissum id munus, ne inter discordias externa molirentur aut maiore ex diverso mercede ius fasque exuerent. trahuntur in partis Sido atque Italicus reges Sueborum, quis vetus obsequium erga Romanos et gens fidei quam iussorum patientior. posita in latus auxilia, infesta Raetia, cui Porcius Septiminus procurator erat, incorruptae erga Vitellium fidei. igitur Sextilius Felix cum ala Auriana et octo cohortibus ac Noricorum iuventute ad occupandam ripam Aeni fluminis, quod Raetos Noricosque interfluit, missus. nec his aut illis proelium temptantibus, fortuna partium alibi transacta.
5.
At all events, written orders were sent to Aponius Saturninus to bring up the army of Moesia without delay and move the war to Italy in a safe and timely manner. To protect the undefended provinces from barbarian attacks, the chiefs governing the Sarmatian Iazuges were summoned to serve in the army. These leaders also volunteered their men and their powerful cavalry, their only effective force, but the offer was turned down, in case they might attempt, in the midst of our civil discords, some hostile action or, lured by higher rewards from the other side, trample underfoot all considerations of law and justice. Sido and Italicus, rulers of the Suebi, were won over to Vespasian’s side. Their obedience to Rome was longstanding and their subjects preferred to remain loyal than be coerced into submission. Auxiliary troops were placed on the flanks of the army, since Raetia was hostile and Porcius Septimius, its procurator, entirely devoted to Vitellius. Consequently, Sextilius Felix was sent with the Aurian cavalry regiment, eight infantry cohorts, and a contingent of militia from Noricum to secure the bank of the Aenus River which divides Raetia from Noricum. As neither side ventured to engage, the fate of the rival parties was sealed elsewhere.
VI.
Antonio vexillarios e cohortibus et partem equitum ad invadendam Italiam rapienti comes fuit Arrius Varus, strenuus bello, quam gloriam et dux Corbulo et prosperae in Armenia res addiderant. idem secretis apud Neronem sermonibus ferebatur Corbulonis virtutes criminatus; unde infami gratia primum pilum adepto laeta ad praesens male parta mox in perniciem vertere. sed Primus ac Varus occupata Aquileia [per] proxima quaeque et Opitergii et Altini laetis animis accipiuntur. relictum Altini praesidium adversus classis Ravennatis [conatus], nondum defectione eius audita. inde Patavium et Ateste partibus adiunxere. illic cognitum tris Vitellianas cohortis et alam, cui Sebosianae nomen, ad Forum Alieni ponte iuncto consedisse. placuit occasio invadendi incuriosos; nam id quoque nuntiabatur. luce prima inermos plerosque oppressere. praedictum ut paucis interfectis ceteros pavore ad mutandam fidem cogerent. et fuere qui se statim dederent: plures abrupto ponte instanti hosti viam abstulerunt. principia belli secundum Flavianos data.
6.
To invade Italy, Antonius Primus rushed forward selected detachments from the cohorts and part of the cavalry. He was accompanied by Arrius Varus, a resolute soldier, who had acquired fame for his service under Corbulo and his own successes in Armenia. This Varus was thought to have cast aspersions on the good name of Corbulo in secret interviews with Nero. As a reward for his duplicity, he had obtained the rank of chief centurion, but this ill-gotten success, though it gave him joy at the time, later turned to his ruin. Be that as it may, Primus and Varus occupied Aquileia, then advanced into Italy by degrees, being enthusiastically welcomed at Opitergium and Altinum. A garrison was left in Altinum to ward off any attempt by the fleet at Ravenna, of whose defection they were not aware. Next they won Patavium and Ateste over to their side. At the latter location they heard that three of Vitellius cohorts and the cavalry regiment named Sebosian had taken up position at Forum Alieni and had built a bridge. The occasion was judged good for an attack, for it was also known that the Vitellians were off their guard. At dawn they killed several of their opponents before they had time to arm. The order had been given in advance to cut down but a few, in order to frighten the rest into changing sides. In fact some surrendered at once; the larger number destroyed the bridge, cutting short the pursuit of the enemy, who were hot on their heels. [Thus] the first engagement was favorable to the Flavian side.
VII.
Vulgata victoria legiones septima Galbiana, tertia decima Gemina cum Vedio Aquila legato Patavium alacres veniunt. ibi pauci dies ad requiem sumpti, et Minicius Iustus praefectus castrorum legionis septimae, quia adductius quam civili bello imperitabat, subtractus militum irae ad Vespasianum missus est. desiderata diu res interpretatione gloriaque in maius accipitur, postquam Galbae imagines discordia temporum subversas in omnibus municipiis recoli iussit Antonius, decorum pro causa ratus, si placere Galbae principatus et partes revirescere crederentur.
7.
As reports of the success became known, two legions, the Seventh Galbiana and the Thirteenth Gemina, the latter commanded by the legate Vedius Aquila, came to Patavium, eager for action. A few days were spent resting, during which the camp prefect of the Seventh legion, Minicius Justus, who kept a tighter rein on discipline than it is called for in civil wars, was rescued from the anger of the troops and sent to Vespasian. A long-awaited measure was given an interpretation that gratified Antonius’ vanity, but far outstripped its own merits. He gave orders that the statues of Galba, which were taken down during the disorders of the times, be set up again for worship in every municipal town. His belief was that the gesture would add dignity to the Flavian cause, in that the Flavians would be seen as the supporters of Galba’s principate and the restorer of its fortunes.
VIII.
Quaesitum inde quae sedes bello legeretur. Verona potior visa, patentibus circum campis ad pugnam equestrem, qua praevalebant: simul coloniam copiis validam auferre Vitellio in rem famamque videbatur. possessa ipso transitu Vicetia; quod per se parvum (etenim modicae municipio vires) magni momenti locum obtinuit reputantibus illic Caecinam genitum et patriam hostium duci ereptam. in Veronensibus pretium fuit: exemplo opibusque partis iuvere; et interiectus exercitus Raetiam Iuliasque Alpis, [ac] ne pervium illa Germanicis exercitibus foret, obsaepserat. quae ignara Vespasiano aut vetita: quippe Aquileiae sisti bellum expectarique Mucianum iubebat, adiciebatque imperio consilium, quando Aegyptus, claustra annonae, vectigalia opulentissimarum provinciarum obtinerentur, posse Vitellii exercitum egestate stipendii frumentique ad deditionem subigi. eadem Mucianus crebris epistulis monebat, incruentam et sine luctu victoriam et alia huiusce modi praetexendo, sed gloriae avidus atque omne belli decus sibi retinens. ceterum ex distantibus terrarum spatiis consilia post res adferebantur.
8.
The next question to be considered was the choice of a base from which to operate. Verona seemed preferable, for the open fields surrounding it lent themselves to cavalry engagements, where their superiority lay. At the same time it was obvious that to rob Vitellius of a colony so rich in resources would both profit their cause and add to their prestige. As they advanced, they occupied Vicetia, in itself no great achievement for the town had but few resources, yet its seizure had great significance when one considers that Vicetia was Caecina’s birthplace and that the leader of the opposing army had his hometown wrested from him. In holding Verona the benefit was tangible: its people helped the cause by their example and contributions; then, with the army now placed between Raetia and the Julian Alps, the passage by which the German army could come was blocked. These operations were carried out without informing Vespasian or rather against his wishes, for indeed his instructions were to stop the advance at Aquileia and there await Mucianus’ arrival. He explained his mandates by adding that it was possible to force Vitellius’army to surrender through shortage of money and food, since Egypt, and with it the key to the corn supplies, was in their hands, together with the revenues of the richest provinces. Mucianus in frequent messages advised the same policy, ostensibly calling for a victory without blood and loss of life and similar objectives, whereras in fact he hungered after fame and was reserving all the glory of the war for himself. In any case, because of the vast distances involved, these recommendations arrived after the events.
IX.
…igitur repentino incursu Antonius stationes hostium inrupit; temptatisque levi proelio animis ex aequo discessum. mox Caecina inter Hostiliam, vicum Veronensium, et paludes Tartari fluminis castra permuniit, tutus loco, cum terga flumine, latera obiectu paludis tegerentur. quod si adfuisset fides, aut opprimi universis Vitellianorum viribus duae legiones, nondum coniuncto Moesico exercitu, potuere, aut retro actae deserta Italia turpem fugam conscivissent. sed Caecina per varias moras prima hostibus prodidit tempora belli, dum quos armis pellere promptum erat, epistulis increpat, donec per nuntios pacta perfidiae firmaret. interim Aponius Saturninus cum legione septima Claudiana advenit. legioni tribunus Vipstanus Messala praeerat, claris maioribus, egregius ipse et qui solus ad id bellum artis bonas attulisset. has ad copias nequaquam Vitellianis paris (quippe tres adhuc legiones erant) misit epistulas Caecina, temeritatem victa arma tractantium incusans. simul virtus Germanici exercitus laudibus attollebatur, Vitellii modica et vulgari mentione, nulla in Vespasianum contumelia: nihil prorsus quod aut corrumperet hostem aut terreret. Flavianarum partium duces omissa prioris fortunae defensione pro Vespasiano magnifice, pro causa fidenter, de exercitu securi, in Vitellium ut inimici praesumpsere, facta tribunis centurionibusque retinendi quae Vitellius indulsisset spe; atque ipsum Caecinam non obscure ad transitionem hortabantur. recitatae pro contione epistulae addidere fiduciam, quod submisse Caecina, velut offendere Vespasianum timens, ipsorum duces contemptim tamquam insultantes Vitellio scripsissent.
9.
…so Antonius, by a sudden assault, fell upon the enemy’s posts and, after testing their courage in a light skirmish, he pulled back his forces, leaving the issue undecided. Soon after, Caecina fortified a camp between Hostilia, a village of the Veronese, and the marshes of the river Tartarus, a very secure place, his rear being protected by the river and his flanks by the marshes. But if Caecina had remained loyal, he could either have crushed Antonius’ two legions (the Moesian forces had not yet joined them) with the combined Vitellian strength, or compelled them to retreat and to abandon Italy in ignominious flight. But Caecina, by repeated delays, lost to the opposing side the first opportunities of the war, while he upbraided by letters an enemy he could have easily expelled from Italy by force of arms and waited for his emissaries to arrange the terms of his defection. Meanwhile, Aponius Saturninus arrived from Moesia with the Seventh Claudiana legion led by the tribune Vipstanus Messala, a man of noble lineage, himself quite eminent, the only man in the war to have shown integrity. To these troops, whose strength was by no means equal to that of Vitellius – in fact thus far they had only three legions, Caecina addressed a message in which he chided their foolhardiness in defending a cause that had already known defeat. At the same time he vaunted the bravery of the German army, made little and superficial mention of Vitellius and said nothing offensive about Vespasian. All in all, he wrote not a word meant to win over or to frighten away his adversaries. The leaders of the Flavian party omitted in their reply any excuse for their past decisions and boldly proclaimed their unequivocal approval of Vespasian, their commitment to his cause, their confidence in the army, and their enmity to Vitellius. To tribunes and centurions they offered the hope of retaining the privileges granted by Vitellius. Moreover, they openly urged Caecina himself to join their side. This correspondence between the armies, when read before the assembled Flavian troops, boosted morale, for the tone of Caecina’s letter was not aggressive, as if he were afraid to offend Vespasian, whereas their own commander had used contemptuous language with the intent, as it were, to insult Vitellius.
X.
Adventu deinde duarum legionum, e quibus tertiam Dillius Aponianus, octavam Numisius Lupus ducebant, ostentare viris et militari vallo Veronam circumdare placuit. forte Galbianae legioni in adversa fronte valli opus cesserat, et visi procul sociorum equites vanam formidinem ut hostes fecere. rapiuntur arma metu proditionis. ira militum in Tampium Flavianum incubuit, nullo criminis argumento, sed iam pridem invisus turbine quodam ad exitium poscebatur: propinquum Vitellii, proditorem Othonis, interceptorem donativi clamitabant. nec defensioni locus, quamquam supplicis manus tenderet, humi plerumque stratus, lacera veste, pectus atque ora singultu quatiens. id ipsum apud infensos incitamentum erat, tamquam nimius pavor conscientiam argueret. obturbabatur militum vocibus Aponius, cum loqui coeptaret; fremitu et clamore ceteros aspernantur. uni Antonio apertae militum aures; namque et facundia aderat mulcendique vulgum artes et auctoritas. ubi crudescere seditio et a conviciis ac probris ad tela et manus transibant, inici catenas Flaviano iubet. sensit ludibrium miles, disiectisque qui tribunal tuebantur extrema vis parabatur. opposuit sinum Antonius stricto ferro, aut militum se manibus aut suis moriturum obtestans, ut quemque notum et aliquo militari decore insignem aspexerat, ad ferendam opem nomine ciens. mox conversus ad signa et bellorum deos, hostium potius exercitibus illum furorem, illam discordiam inicerent orabat, donec fatisceret seditio et extremo iam die sua quisque in tentoria dilaberentur. profectus eadem nocte Flavianus obviis Vespasiani litteris discrimini exemptus est.
10.
With the subsequent arrival of two more legions, the Third led by Dillius Aponianus and the Eighth led by Numisius Lupus, it was decided to make a demonstration of strength by encircling Verona with a rampart. As it happened, the work in the section of the rampart facing the enemy fell to the men of the Seventh Galbiana legion, who, on catching sight in the distance of the allied cavalry and mistaking them for the enemy, were seized by panic. Fearing some treachery, they ran to their weapons and vented the full brunt of their anger on Tampius Flavianus, though there was no evidence against him of any crime. He had long been unpopular with the troops and now his death was demanded with furious doggedness. They called him Vitellius’ kinsman, Otho’s double-crosser, and a thief who had pocketed their donative. He was given no chance to exculpate himself, though he stretched out his hands in supplication, repeatedly threw himself prostrate on the ground and tore his garments, his features and chest convulsed by sobbing. This very behavior provoked his aggressors even more, for his excessive terror was proof in their eyes of a guilty conscience. When Aponius tried to speak he was shouted down; similar attempts by other commanders were received with angry growls and loud jeering. The men would listen to no one but Antonius, for he was eloquent, knew how to calm an angry multitude, and had the respect of the troops. When the sedition grew worse and the soldiers were about to move from taunts and insults to open violence and the use of arms, he ordered that Flavianus be thrown in jail. But the troops, sensing this was just pretence, dispersed the guards protecting the speaker’s platform and prepared to use extreme force. Antonius unsheathed his sword and pointing it at his own breast vowed he would die at his soldiers’ hands or his own, summoning [at the same time] to his aid by name anyone he recognized in the crowd who stood out for the medals he wore. Then turning his head towards the standards and the sacred images, he kept calling on the gods of war to infuse the enemy’s armies, rather than their own, with such senseless rage and rebellious spirit. While he prayed the tumult began to ebb and, as the day was nearing its end, the soldiers dispersed to their tents. Flavianus left the camp the same night and, on his way out, a message come the opposite way from Vespasian saved him from further danger.