XI.
Legiones velut tabe infectae Aponium Saturninum Moesici exercitus legatum eo atrocius adgrediuntur, quod non, ut prius, labore et opere fessae, sed medio diei exarserant, vulgatis epistulis, quas Saturninus ad Vitellium scripsisse credebatur. ut olim virtutis modestiaeque, tunc procacitatis et petulantiae certamen erat, ne minus violenter Aponium quam Flavianum ad supplicium deposcerent. quippe Moesicae legiones adiutam a se Pannonicorum ultionem referentes, et Pannonici, velut absolverentur aliorum seditione, iterare culpam gaudebant. in hortos, in quibus devertebatur Saturninus, pergunt. nec tam Primus et Aponianus et Messala, quamquam omni modo nisi, eripuere Saturninum quam obscuritas latebrarum, quibus occulebatur, vacantium forte balnearum fornacibus abditus. mox omissis lictoribus Patavium concessit. digressu consularium uni Antonio vis ac potestas in utrumque exercitum fuit, cedentibus collegis et obversis militum studiis. nec deerant qui crederent utramque seditionem fraude Antonii coeptam, ut solus bello frueretur.
11.
The legions, as if affected by contagion, [next] attacked Aponius Saturninus, the commander of the Moesian army, with all the more ferocity since this time their anger flared up at midday, not as before when exhausted by the grueling labor of building the rampart. The cause was the spread of a story about some letters believed to have been written by Saturninus to Vitellius. Just as in former days soldiers strove to outdo one another in valor and discipline, so now they competed in insolence and petulance, for fear they should be less violent in demanding the punishment of Aponius than they had been in Flavianus’ case. Needless to say, the legions of Moesia reminded their Pannonian comrades of the support they had given in punishing Flavianus and these, the Pannonians, were happy to repeat their crime, as if the sedition of others absolved them of their own guilt. The mutineers made their way to the gardens were Saturninus was lodged. Though Primus, Aponianus, and Messala tried their utmost, it was not their intervention that saved him, but rather the meanness of the place he hid in, for he took shelter in the furnace of a bath that chanced to be out of service. Soon after he sent away his lictors and repaired to Patavium. With the departure of the two governors, Antonius alone had power and control over both armies, as his fellow officers submitted to his authority and the soldiers looked to him alone for leadership. There were some who believed that both mutinies were stirred up by Antonius’ cunning, so that he alone might profit from the war.
XII.
Ne in Vitellii quidem partibus quietae mentes: exitiosiore discordia non suspicionibus vulgi, sed perfidia ducum turbabantur. Lucilius Bassus classis Ravennatis praefectus ambiguos militum animos, quod magna pars Dalmatae Pannoniique erant, quae provinciae Vespasiano tenebantur, partibus eius adgregaverat. nox proditioni electa, ut ceteris ignaris soli in principia defectores coirent. Bassus pudore seu metu, quisnam exitus foret, intra domum opperiebatur. trierarchi magno tumultu Vitellii imagines invadunt; et paucis resistentium obtruncatis ceterum vulgus rerum novarum studio in Vespasianum inclinabat. tum progressus Lucilius auctorem se palam praebet. classis Cornelium Fuscum praefectum sibi destinat, qui propere adcucurrit. Bassus honorata custodia Liburnicis navibus Atriam pervectus a praefecto alae Vibennio Rufino, praesidium illic agitante, vincitur, sed exoluta statim vincula interventu Hormi Caesaris liberti: is quoque inter duces habebatur.
12.
Within Vitellius ‘party minds were not at ease either. They were made restless by a more pernicious form of discord, not by the suspicion of the soldiers, but by the treachery of the leaders. Lucilius Bassus, the prefect of the Ravenna fleet, had persuaded his men to join the party of Vespasian. Their attitude had been ambiguous, given that most of them came from Dalmatia and Pannonia, provinces in Vespasian’s hands. Night was the time chosen to perpetrate the treason, so as to allow those in the plot to convene at the camp headquarters alone, without the others knowing. Either from shame or fear, Bassus awaited the outcome in his house. Raising a great outcry, the trierarchs fell upon the images of Vitellius. A few of those who tried to resist were done away with and the rest of the sailors, with the eager desire for change common to multitudes, were inclined to join Vespasian. Then Bassus came forward and openly presented himself as the promoter of the revolt, but the fleet chose instead as its prefect Cornelius Fuscus, who lost no time to come to Ravenna. Bassus, placed under honorable arrest, was conveyed to Atria escorted by Liburnian ships, where he was thrown in jail by Vibennius Rufinus, the commander of a cavalry regiment in station there. He was immediately set free, however, by the intervention of Hormus, one of the imperial freedman, for even one of his sort was among the leaders.
XIII.
At Caecina, defectione classis vulgata, primores centurionum et paucos militum, ceteris per militiae munera dispersis, secretum castrorum adfectans in principia vocat. ibi Vespasiani virtutem virisque partium extollit: transfugisse classem, in arto commeatum, adversas Gallias Hispaniasque, nihil in urbe fidum; atque omnia de Vitellio in deterius. mox incipientibus qui conscii aderant, ceteros re nova attonitos in verba Vespasiani adigit; simul Vitellii imagines dereptae et missi qui Antonio nuntiarent. sed ubi totis castris in fama proditio, recurrens in principia miles praescriptum Vespasiani nomen, proiectas Vitellii effigies aspexit, vastum primo silentium, mox cuncta simul erumpunt. huc cecidisse Germanici exercitus gloriam ut sine proelio, sine vulnere vinctas manus et capta traderent arma? quas enim ex diverso legiones? nempe victas; et abesse unicum Othoniani exercitus robur, primanos quartadecimanosque, quos tamen isdem illis campis fuderint straverintque. ut tot armatorum milia, velut grex venalium, exuli Antonio donum darentur? octo nimirum legiones unius classis accessionem fore. id Basso, id Caecinae visum, postquam domos hortos opes principi abstulerint, etiam militem auferre. integros incruentosque, Flavianis quoque partibus vilis, quid dicturos reposcentibus aut prospera aut adversa?
13.
As to Caecina, when he received news of the fleet’s defection, called together in the camp headquarters the leading centurions and a few of the soldiers, after the rest of the troops had been assigned to various duties, to avoid arousing suspicion. There he exalted the virtues of Vespasian and the strength of his party, whereas what he said of Vitellius’ situation was magnified for the worse: the fleet had deserted him, the supply situation was critical, the posture of Gaul and Spain was hostile, and Rome was not to be relied on. Then those present who were in the plot were first to swear allegiance to Vespasian and soon Caecina prevailed on the rest –all stunned by the sudden twist of events – to do the same. At the same time the images of Vitellius were torn down and messages sent to Antonius. When knowledge of the treason spread through the entire camp and the men rushing to headquarters saw Vespasian’s name inscribed on the standards and Vitellius’ images on the ground, there was a profound silence at first, then all their pent-up anger erupted at once. Had the prestige of the German army fallen so low that without a fight, without a wound they should offer up their hands to be tied and surrender arms to their captors? What legions indeed were those facing them? Were they not the same they had routed? What was more, the only real strength of Otho’s army, the First and Fourteenth legions — which after all they had beaten and scattered on that very plain — was now missing. How could it be that so many thousands of armed men be given as a present to Antonius, an outlaw, as if they were a herd of slaves on sale at the market? If a single fleet had gone over to Vespasian, must eight legions also tag along behind? Bassus and Caecina, after robbing the prince of his palaces, gardens, and wealth, now thought perhaps of robbing him of his soldiers also. With no man and no blood lost in battle, what were they –a cowardly lot even in the eyes of the Flavians– to say to anyone asking about their successes and setbacks?
XIV.
Haec singuli, haec universi, ut quemque dolor impulerat, vociferantes, initio a quinta legione orto, repositis Vitellii imaginibus vincla Caecinae iniciunt; Fabium Fabullum quintae legionis legatum et Cassium Longum praefectum castrorum duces deligunt; forte oblatos trium Liburnicarum milites, ignaros et insontis, trucidant; relictis castris, abrupto ponte Hostiliam rursus, inde Cremonam pergunt, ut legionibus primae Italicae et unietvicensimae Rapaci iungerentur, quas Caecina ad obtinendam Cremonam cum parte equitum praemiserat.
14.
Thus they clamored, singly or all at once, as anger moved each of them. Following the lead of the Fifth legion, they put Vitellius’ images back in place and Caecina in irons. As their leaders they chose Fabius Fabullus, Fifth legion commander, and Cassius Longus, the prefect of the camp. They slew the crews of three light galleys, whom chance had placed in the soldiers’ way, although they knew nothing of the latest developments and were not in any way involved. The army abandoned the camp, cut the bridge and headed back once again to Hostilia. From there they marched on to Cremona to join up with the First Italica and Twenty-first Rapax, the two legions Caecina had sent ahead with a portion of the cavalry to secure Cremona.
XV.
Vbi haec comperta Antonio, discordis animis, discretos viribus hostium exercitus adgredi statuit, antequam ducibus auctoritas, militi obsequium et iunctis legionibus fiducia rediret. namque Fabium Valentem profectum ab urbe adceleraturumque cognita Caecinae proditione coniectabat; et fidus Vitellio Fabius nec militiae ignarus. simul ingens Germanorum vis per Raetiam timebatur. et Britannia Galliaque et Hispania auxilia Vitellius acciverat, immensam belli luem, ni Antonius id ipsum metuens festinato proelio victoriam praecepisset. universo cum exercitu secundis a Verona castris Bedriacum venit. postero die legionibus ad muniendum retentis, auxiliares cohortes in Cremonensem agrum missae ut specie parandarum copiarum civili praeda miles imbueretur: ipse cum quattuor milibus equitum ad octavum a Bedriaco progressus quo licentius popularentur. exploratores, ut mos est, longius curabant.
15.
When Antonius got wind of this, he decided to attack the enemy forces while they were still in a state of discord and their strength spread out, that is before the leaders’ authority and the soldiers’ trust were reestablished and the legions’ confidence returned with the junction of their forces. It was clear to him that Fabius Valens had by now left Rome and was pressing on posthaste after hearing of Caecina’s betrayal. He also knew that Fabius was truly loyal to Vitellius and a competent field commander. At the same time, Antonius worried about the threat of massive German forces advancing through Rhaetia. Furthermore, Vitellius had summoned reinforcements from Britain, Gaul, and Spain, an unstoppable engine of war had not Antonius, fearing that very danger, secured victory in advance by provoking an early engagement. He reached Bedriacum after a two-day march from Verona and next day he kept back the legions to fortify his position, sending out his auxiliary infantry to the plain around Cremona, ostensibly to gather supplies, but really to initiate the soldiers to the pillages of civil wars. He himself with four thousand cavalry advanced eight miles outside Bedriacum to give them more freedom to plunder. The scouts, as usual, ranged farther afield.
XVI.
Quinta ferme hora diei erat, cum citus eques adventare hostis, praegredi paucos, motum fremitumque late audiri nuntiavit. dum Antonius quidnam agendum consultat, aviditate navandae operae Arrius Varus cum promptissimis equitum prorupit impulitque Vitellianos modica caede; nam plurium adcursu versa fortuna, et acerrimus quisque sequentium fugae ultimus erat. nec sponte Antonii properatum, et fore quae acciderant rebatur. hortatus suos ut magno animo capesserent pugnam, diductis in latera turmis vacuum medio relinquit iter quo Varum equitesque eius reciperet; iussae armari legiones; datum per agros signum ut, qua cuique proximum, omissa praeda proelio occurreret. pavidus interim Varus turbae suorum miscetur intulitque formidinem. pulsi cum sauciis integri suomet ipsi metu et angustiis viarum conflictabantur.
16.
At about eleven o’clock in the morning a rider came up at full speed with news that the enemy was approaching, preceded by a small advance party; the tramp and bustle [of an army in movement], he said, could be heard far and wide. While Antonius was deciding what to do, Arrius Varus, in his desire to distinguish himself, charged together with the boldest of the cavalry and forced back the Vitellians, inflicting but a few casualties, for the intervention of a larger number of the enemy turned the tide of battle and those who had been most forward in the charge were now the last to find safety in retreat. The attack was made against Antonius’ wishes, who had foreseen the consequences. He called on his men to engage the enemy with brave hearts and drew off the cavalry to the flanks, leaving an open passage in the middle to receive back Varus and his men. Orders were sent to the legions to prepare for battle; the signal went out all over the countryside for every man to abandon plundering and rush to join the fray by the shortest route. Meanwhile, the panic-stricken Varus merged back with the main body, spreading fear. Compelled by their own panic, wounded fugitives and fresh troops all gave ground and buffeted one another in the narrow road.
XVII.
Nullum in illa trepidatione Antonius constantis ducis aut fortis militis officium omisit. occursare paventibus, retinere cedentis, ubi plurimus labor, unde aliqua spes, consilio manu voce insignis hosti, conspicuus suis. eo postremo ardoris provectus est ut vexillarium fugientem hasta transverberaret; mox raptum vexillum in hostem vertit. quo pudore haud plures quam centum equites restitere: iuvit locus, artiore illic via et fracto interfluentis rivi ponte, qui incerto alveo et praecipitibus ripis fugam impediebat. ea necessitas seu fortuna lapsas iam partis restituit. firmati inter se densis ordinibus excipiunt Vitellianos temere effusos, atque illi consternantur. Antonius instare perculsis, sternere obvios, simul ceteri, ut cuique ingenium, spoliare, capere, arma equosque abripere. et exciti prospero clamore, qui modo per agros fuga palabantur, victoriae se miscebant.
17.
In that fearful confusion Antonius neglected none of the duties of a resolute commander and a courageous soldier. He rushed to steady those who showed fear and checked anyone who was about to run away; where the struggle was heaviest, from whatever part of the field came any ray of hope, he was on hand with his counsel, his encouragement, and his sword, an unmistakable presence to his men and a prominent mark for the enemy. In an excess of ardour he impaled with a lance a fleeing standard bearer, then seized the standard and turned it towards the enemy. Shamed by his example, a few of the troopers, no more than one hundred, held their ground. The terrain was helpful, as the road narrowed at that point and the bridge across a stream was destroyed. The stream itself, with its uncertain depth and steep banks, was a barrier to flight. That constraint — or rather good luck — gave a second chance to the side that appeared to have already lost the battle. Closing ranks and supporting one another, Antonius’men bore the attack of the Vitellians — who advanced imprudently dispersed — and beat them back. Antonius came down hard on those who thought of flight and slew anyone who came up against him. Meanwhile the rest of the soldiers, each according to his nature, robbed the dead, took prisoners, seized weapons and horses. Attracted by the triumphant shouting, men who moments before were scampering through the fields in flight came back to share in the victory.
XVIII.
Ad quartum a Cremona lapidem fulsere legionum signa Rapacis atque Italicae, laeto inter initia equitum suorum proelio illuc usque provecta. sed ubi fortuna contra fuit, non laxare ordines, non recipere turbatos, non obviam ire ultroque adgredi hostem tantum per spatium cursu et pugnando fessum. [forte victi] haud perinde rebus prosperis ducem desideraverant atque in adversis deesse intellegebant. nutantem aciem victor equitatus incursat; et Vipstanus Messala tribunus cum Moesicis auxiliaribus adsequitur, quos multi e legionariis quamquam raptim ductos aequabant: ita mixtus pedes equesque rupere legionum agmen. et propinqua Cremonensium moenia quanto plus spei ad effugium minorem ad resistendum animum dabant. nec Antonius ultra institit, memor laboris ac vulnerum, quibus tam anceps proelii fortuna, quamvis prospero fine, equites equosque adflictaverat.
18.
The glitter from the standards of the Rapax and Italica legions could be seen four miles from Cremona. The two legions had marched that far during the initial success of the Vitellian cavalry [in the wake of Varus’ charge], but when fortune changed, they did not relax their ranks or receive any fugitives or even less take the offensive against an enemy now weary after their long advance and the fighting. With no one to direct them except chance, these Vitellian troops, who in success had hardly felt the need of a leader, in their hour of crisis regretted the lack of guidance. Their line of battle faltered when the victorious cavalry came charging, followed by the tribune Vipsanus Messala at the head of the auxiliary troops from Moesia and of many legionaries, who had kept up with the auxiliaries in spite of the rapidity with which these were led. Thus, a [small] mixed force of foot soldiers and horsemen broke through the line of the two legions. It must be said also that the more the vicinity of Cremona’s walls gave the Vitellians hope of a safe escape, the less it motivated them to resist. Antonius did not press the matter further, for he knew the fatigue and suffering men and horses had borne in a battle so long undecided, albeit successful in the end.
XIX.
Inumbrante vespera universum Flaviani exercitus robur advenit. utque cumulos super et recentia caede vestigia incessere, quasi debellatum foret, pergere Cremonam et victos in deditionem accipere aut expugnare deposcunt. haec in medio, pulchra dictu: illa sibi quisque, posse coloniam plano sitam impetu capi. idem audaciae per tenebras inrumpentibus et maiorem rapiendi licentiam. quod si lucem opperiantur, iam pacem, iam preces, et pro labore ac vulneribus clementiam et gloriam, inania, laturos, sed opes Cremonensium in sinu praefectorum legatorumque fore. expugnatae urbis praedam ad militem, deditae ad duces pertinere. spernuntur centuriones tribunique, ac ne vox cuiusquam audiatur, quatiunt arma, rupturi imperium ni ducantur.
19.
Towards dusk, the full strength of the Flavian army came up. As the soldiers stepped over the heaps of the fallen and the recent signs of carnage in the battle, they began to demand, just as if the war were already over, that they advance to Cremona and either receive its surrender or proceed to storm the town. That is what they said openly, and fine words they were. What each man thought to himself was that the colony, situated on level ground, could be carried with one bold stroke. The darkness of the night would not lessen their courage in the assault and the license to plunder would be greater. But if instead they waited for daylight there would first be appeals for mercy then peace, and in return for all their labors and wounds, they, the rank and file of the army, would gain only a vain renown for clemency and glory without profit – worthless treappings, while the riches of Cremona would go into the officers’ pockets. The loot belonged to the soldiers if the town was captured, to the commander if it capitulated. So they began to sneer at centurions and tribunes and kept rattling their arms to drown anyone’s words. Open mutiny was soon to follow unless they were led [to Cremona].
XX.
Tum Antonius inserens se manipulis, ubi aspectu et auctoritate silentium fecerat, non se decus neque pretium eripere tam bene meritis adfirmabat, sed divisa inter exercitum ducesque munia: militibus cupidinem pugnandi convenire, duces providendo, consultando, cunctatione saepius quam temeritate prodesse. ut pro virili portione armis ac manu victoriam iuverit, ratione et consilio, propriis ducis artibus, profuturum; neque enim ambigua esse quae occurrant, noctem et ignotae situm urbis, intus hostis et cuncta insidiis opportuna. non si pateant portae, nisi explorato, nisi die intrandum. an obpugnationem inchoaturos adempto omni prospectu, quis aequus locus, quanta altitudo moenium, tormentisne et telis an operibus et vineis adgredienda urbs foret? mox conversus ad singulos, num securis dolabrasque et cetera expugnandis urbibus secum attulissent, rogitabat. et cum abnuerent, ‘gladiisne’ inquit ‘et pilis perfringere ac subruere muros ullae manus possunt? si aggerem struere, si pluteis cratibusve protegi necesse fuerit, ut vulgus improvidum inriti stabimus, altitudinem turrium et aliena munimenta mirantes? quin potius mora noctis unius, advectis tormentis machinisque, vim victoriamque nobiscum ferimus?’ simul lixas calonesque cum recentissimis equitum Bedriacum mittit, copias ceteraque usui adlaturos.
20.
Then Antonius went among the ranks and commanded silence by his presence and authority. He assured them it was not his desire to rob of their glory and reward those who had deserved them so well, but he said that there was a division of duties between an army and its leaders. The craving for action is the requisite of the soldiers; generals did their part by planning ahead, by consulting together, by delaying action more often than by rushing into it. In the same way he had contributed to the victory, so far as a man could, with his sword in hand, [so now] he would help by providing foresight and direction, talents proper to a leader. There could be little doubt as to the obstacles before them: the darkness of night, the layout of a strange town, the enemy within, everything in favor of ambuscades. Even if the gates were wide open, they must not enter except after reconnaissance and during daylight. Were they to attempt to storm the town without being able to see which places were level, how high the walls, whether the town was to be invested using catapults and missiles or siegeworks and mantlets? Then, addressing individual soldiers in turn, he kept asking if they had brought with them hatchets, picks, and all the other tools for taking cities. When they answered they had not, he asked them if they thought hands could break through and undermine walls using swords and javelins. Supposing, he added, it became necessary for them to build a ramp or to shelter themselves behind screens or under mantlets, would they just stand there baffled, like a helpless lot, gaping in wonder at the height of the towers and at other people’s defenses? Why not instead wait out that one night and, with the arrival of catapults and other siege engines, have with them the force that would give them victory? Without wasting time Antonius sent to Bedriacum sutlers and servants with the freshest men among the cavalry to bring back supplies and all else that was needed.